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Despite Brazil's importance in the world economy and its increasing
participation in foreign trade, there is considerable legal uncertainty re-
garding the law applicable to international commercial contracts involving
Brazilian parties because Brazilian judicial courts do not respect parties'
freedom to choose the governing law, thus this determination is only made
by a judge, according to Private International Law rules of the forum. Ap-
plying these rules, this study demonstrates that there are at least three po-
tential legal regimes: the Brazilian law, the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and a foreign domestic sales
law. Making use of the American law as the foreign law, a comparative
analysis of these three legal regimes regarding contract formation demon-
strates that their approaches are very distinct, and this confirms the legal
uncertainty. In order to reduce this problem, three different strategies are
proposed to the Brazilian government.
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I. INTRODUCTIONIN 2009, Brazil became the world's eighth largest economy with a
nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD $1.574 trillion.' It
is the largest economy in Latin America and the second largest in the
western hemisphere. 2 As a result of its recent advances in economic de-
velopment, financial analysts classify Brazil as a BRIC country.3 In addi-
1. According to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the CIA
World Factbook.
2. Brazil Country Profile, BBC Ne~ws (Mar. 19, 2011, 3:55 PM), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/country-profiles/1227110.stm; Brazil Business Briefing, Center for
Latin American Studies, U. Prr. (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/clas/
about/brazil/bbb.html.
3. BRIC is an acronym that refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China. According to
Goldman Sachs analysts, by 2050 their combined economies would surpass the
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tion, Brazil is an active member of several economic organizations,
including the World Trade Organization (WTO) 4 and the Common Mar-
ket of the South (Mercosur). 5 In 2009, Brazil exported approximately
USD $153 billion and imported USD $127.6 billion, totaling USD $281
billion in foreign trade flow. 6 It has been predicted that this volume is
likely to grow because Brazil is one of the fastest-growing economies in
the world.7 Brazil's main trading partners include the United States,
China, Argentina, Netherlands, Germany, and Japan.8
Taking into account Brazil's importance in the world economy and its
increasing participation in foreign trade, it is relevant for Brazilian na-
tionals trading internationally, as well as for their foreign counterparts, to
know in advance which legal regimes their international commercial con-
tracts could be subject to. Certainty with respect to the applicable law
reduces transaction costs and allows parties to better manage their risks.
Unfortunately, Brazil is among the few countries that do not fully respect
the parties' right to choose the law applicable to their transactions.9
Therefore, Brazilian parties and their counterparts may not have an ex
ante choice of law, particularly if Brazil is the forum state.
In this event, the determination of the governing law would only be
made in a potential lawsuit, by a judge, according to Private International
Law (PIL) rules of the forum, adding considerable uncertainty to the
deal. PIL rules concerning contracts usually point to the law of the
combined economies of what are currently the richest countries in the world. See
Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to
2050, Go3M. EcoNoMics PAPER No: 9, at 1, 3, 4 (Oct. 1, 2003), http://www2.
goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf.
4. See Brazil and the WTO, WoRixo TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/thewto e/countries_elbrazile.htm (last visited June 18, 2011). The WTO is
an organization that aims for international trade liberalization. It was created by
the Marrakech Agreement in 1995, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) of 1947. See Uruguay Round Agreement: Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, WoRut oTRADE1 ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto e.htm (last visited June 18,
2011).
5. Mercosur (Common Market of the South)-Profile, BBC Niws (June 16, 2011, 2:38
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5195834.stm (last visited June 18, 2011).
Mercosur is a regional trade agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay founded in 1991.
6. MINIsR'1uo no DEsvNvoIyIMIN-ro, INDusTRIA E CoMERCIo Ex-iRIoR,
BALANCA COMERCIAi BRASILEIRA DADOS CONSOL.IDADOS [BRAZILIAN TRADE
BALANCE CONSOIDATEID DATA] at 7-9 (2009), available at http://www.desenvolvi
mento.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl 1275505327.pdf.
7. Press Release, Int'l Trade Admin., Senior Commerce Trade Official Michael
Camunez Spotlights U.S.-Brazil Relationship and Advances U.S. Trade and Mar-
ket Access, Dep't of Commerce (April 15, 2011), http://trade.gov/press/press-re-
leases/201 1 /senior-commerce-trade-official-michael-camunez-spotlights-us-brazil-
relationshup-and-advances-us-trade-and-market-access04l81 1.asp.
8. BRAZILIAN TRADE BALANCE CONSOLIDATEID DATA, supra note 6, at 28.
9. For a reference to countries that do not acknowledge the principle of party auton-
omy, see JOCIIEN SCHlRODER & CHRISTIAN WENNER, INTERNATIONALS VER-
TRAGSRIClIT: EDAS IKIOLLISIONSRECIlT .E R ZITRASNATIONALEN
WIR-rsCIArsvEIRTRAGE (2d ed. 1998).
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seller's or the buyer's place of business.10 Thus, there are at least two
domestic laws that could potentially be applied to a contractual dispute.
In theory, if one party is from Brazil, Brazilian law would be one of these
regimes, and if the other party is a foreigner, her country's law would be
the other. But if the foreign party is from a country that has ratified the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG)," this convention would be a third potentially applicable
regime. Taking into account the fact that, to date, the CISG has been
ratified by seventy-six countries,'12 including Brazil's main trading part-
ners, there is a reasonable chance that this would be the case.
But with respect to international contracts for the sale of goods per-
fected between Brazilian parties and parties from Brazil's two most im-
portant trading partners, the United States and China, the CISG may be
replaced by the American or the Chinese domestic sales laws. Despite
the fact that these countries have ratified the CISG, both made a reserva-
tion under article 95, which prevents CISG from applying when one or
both parties of the contract are not from a member state. As a result, any
contract perfected between Brazilian parties and parties from the United
States or China may face more uncertainty because there is no consensus
regarding the interpretation of this reservation.' 3
Considering the great legal uncertainty experienced by Brazilian par-
ties and their foreign counterparts when buying or selling goods interna-
tionally, an analysis of the various legal regimes that may end up being
the law applicable to their contractual transactions is of great importance.
In addition, a description of how these regimes differ from one another
may show either that their differences are not so relevant, which may
reduce the unpredictability, at least, with respect to the outcome, or that
they are substantial, which may increase the uncertainty.
The aim of this thesis is to measure this legal uncertainty. Section II
examines which legal regimes may govern international contractual dis-
putes involving Brazilian parties and their foreign counterparts according
to the Principle of Party Autonomy and the use of PIL rules, and the
likelihood of these regimes being applied. In section III, a comparative
study is conducted of Brazilian law, the CISG, and American law, with
10. See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 4, $ 2,
opened for signature June 19, 1980, 2007 O.J. (L 374) 1-19 (EC) [hereinafter 1980
Rome Convention]; Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Inter-
national Contracts, arts. 12, 22, Mar. 17, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. No. 78, 33 I.L.M. 732
[hereinafter 1994 Mexico Convention].
11. See generally United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales
of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, available at, http://www.uncitral.org/pdfl
english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf [hereinafter CISG].
12. See UNlfED NAIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCI-
TRAL), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/salegoods/1980CISG-
status.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter CISG Contracting States] (in-
cludes updated list of CISG contracting states).
13. See Annotated Text of CISG Article 95, PACE L. Scai. INST. OF INT'L COM. L. (June
9, 2011), http://www.cisg.Iaw.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-95.htmI (providing three
"[v]ariations in interpretations of Article 95 reservations.").
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respect to the formation of business contracts for the sale of goods. The
purpose of the study is to identify the differences between these three
regimes. In this section, salient controversial points are compared, such
as the similarities and differences between legal systems and sources of
law, the common law "consideration" objective requirement, rules on
proposal, acceptance and counter-offer, the moment and place of con-
tract formation, and also formal requirements.
In this thesis, the Brazilian sales law will be examined in detail, because
very little has been written in English about it and foreign parties trading
with Brazil may be interested in the information. The CISG was chosen
for this comparative study because it is the most relevant treaty governing
international commercial transactions.14 The U.S. domestic law was also
selected because the United States is now one of Brazil's most important
trading partners,1 5 and, as explained above, the CISG may not apply to
commercial transactions involving a Brazilian party and an American
party because the United States made a reservation on this matter.' 6 A
full comparison of international commercial contracts regulation would
require that both contract formation and the parties' rights and obliga-
tions be covered because the CISG covers these two topics. Because of
time and space constraints, however, this analysis is restricted to "con-
tract formation," as it is the starting point for the existence of an agree-
ment in any jurisdiction.




According to Petar Sarcevic, "the principle of party autonomy guaran-
tees that the contracting parties are free to determine the 'rules of the
game' by dictating the terms of the contract."17 Consequently, parties
14. In comparison to the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and
the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (ULFIS), each of which was ratified by only nine countries and to other
attempts at legal unification in the field of international sales law, the CISG, as far
as the number of signatories states is concerned, has registered the most success.
15. Currently, the United States is Brazil's major foreign supplier and its second major
foreign buyer. Indeed, in 2009, the United States sold $20,183 million in goods to
Brazil, representing 15.8 percent of Brazil's imports, and bought $15,740 million in
goods from Brazil, equivalent to 10.2 percent of Brazil's exports. The 2010 figures
may be different because China is replacing the United States as Brazil's major
supplier. Tiii Wom.o FACrBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/br.html (last visited June 18, 2011).
16. Despite the fact that, among Brazil's major trading partners, the United States and
China are the only ones that made such reservation, Chinese law was not chosen
for this study because Chinese domestic sales law recently underwent reform,
modeling itself on the CISG. See CISG Contracting States.
17. PETAR SARCEvic, The CISG and Regional Unification, in 5 Tiuw 1980 UNwFoRM
SAus LAw-Ol o Issui-s Re-viscrnn IN THlE LiGiur oiF RECENT EXPERIENCES,
(Franco Ferrari ed., 2003).
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may, by mutual agreement, choose ex ante the substantive law of a partic-
ular country or an international treaty to regulate their affairs, as well as
the tribunal that will solve their prospective contractual disputes, regard-
less of their relation to that specific law or forum.' 8
1. Choice-of-Law Freedom
The parties' choice-of-law freedom is the rule in most western, industri-
alized countries, including the United States,'9 countries from the Euro-
pean Union,20 and countries that have ratified the Inter-American
Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts (1994
Mexico Convention). 21 Some jurisdictions, however, have refused to rec-
ognize choice-of-law clauses. 22 Brazil is the most notable example.
The Brazilian PIL rules are contained in the 1942 Introductory Law to
the Civil Code (Lei de Introduqlo ao C6digo Civil-LICC), which in arti-
cle 9, caput,2 3 establishes that the law applicable to international contracts
is the law where the contract was entered into.24 But whenever it is im-
possible to determine where the contract was formed-for instance, if the
parties did not meet in person to execute it, which is common due to the
use of electronic communications in international sales transactions-ar-
ticle 9(2) of LICC presumes that the contract was perfected in the of-
feror's place of business.25 The offeror can be either the seller or the
buyer, depending on who, according to Brazilian law, made the binding
acceptance. 26
Because article 9 of LICC neither expressly allows nor expressly pro-
hibits parties from choosing the law applicable to their commercial trans-
actions, the applicability of the principle of party autonomy in Brazil has
been the subject of much discussion among Brazilian scholars. The ma-
jority argues that choice-of-law clauses are unenforceable because article
9 of LICC is mandatory, 27 and that therefore parties to an international
18. For a reference of countries that do not acknowledge the principle of party auton-
omy, see Scmoi.iR & WENNER, supra note 9.
19. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1977).
20. 1980 Rome Convention, supra note 10, art. 3; See also Regulation No. 593/2008 on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 177/6) (EC). This
Regulation replaced the 1980 Rome Convention for contracts concluded after De-
cember 17, 2009.
21. 1994 Mexico Convention, supra note 10, art. 7. For an update list of contracting
states, see ORGANIZATION oF AMi;RICAN S-rAT-s, http://www.oas.org/juridico/En-
glish/sigs/b-56.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). Brazil signed this convention, but
did not ratify it.
22. SCIRODER & WENNER, supra note 9.
23. Lei No. 4.657, de 4 Setembro de 1942, Dibrio Oficial da Uniio [D.O.U.] de
9.9.1942 (Braz.) [hereinafter LICC]. Article 9, caput, of the LICC reads: "Obliga-
tions shall be governed by the law of the country where they were constituted."
24. Id.
25. Id. art. 9, § 2. It reads: "Contractual obligations are presumed to be constituted at
the place where the offeror resides."
26. NADIA D)E ARAUJO, Direito International Privado: Teoria e Pratica Brasileira 322-
24 (2d ed. 2004).
27. Mandatory provisions have a general purpose, and thus they cannot be altered by
the parties' agreement. In contrast, non-mandatory provisions are not directly re-
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contract could not have an ex ante free choice of law.2 8 Scholars who
adopt a moderate position admit that it is possible for parties to choose
Brazilian law as the law applicable to their contracts if the principle of
party autonomy is recognized in the jurisdiction where the contract was
entered into.29 A minority of scholars support the full applicability of this
principle in Brazil, reasoning that the 1917 LICC, which the 1942 LICC
replaced, expressly allowed the parties' choice-of-law freedom,30 and that
this essential principle cannot be negated by simple omission.3'
This extensive doctrinal discussion of the recognition of the principle of
party autonomy in Brazil has been attributed to the lack of judicial deci-
sions on the issue. Brazilian judicial courts have dealt with the subject
only incidentally, tending to support a literal interpretation of article 9 of
LICC.32 Moreover, even though parties could travel in order to perfect
the contract in the place they want to regulate their affairs, or put them-
selves intentionally in the position of either the offeror or the offeree,
Brazilian judicial courts, whenever the contract has to be executed in
Brazil, have been willing to apply Brazilian law by invoking the "public
lated to the social interest, so they can be derogated by the parties' will. Sil-vio
ROoRauns, DIRuffo CivIL 16 (2003).
28. Joao Grandino Rodas, Elementos de Conexdo do Direito Internacional Privado
Brasileiro Relativamente as ObrigaC6es Contratuais, in 59 CONTRATOS INTERNA-
CIONAis 59 (2002); NADIA DiE ARAUJO, CONTRATOS INTERNACIONAIS:
AUrONOMIA 1)A VONTADE, MERCOSUL E CONVENQOES INTERNACIONAIS 118
(2004); MARIA H EII-NA DINiz, LI DE INTRODUAO AO CODIGO Civil- INTER-
PRETADA 246 (1994); AMfLCAR DE CASTRO, Dnmrro INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
433-45 (1987); WI-soN DE SOUZA CAMPOS BATALIIA, TRATADO ELEMENTAR o
DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 192-93 (1961); MONICA YosIiZA'ro
BIBRWAGFN, PRINCfPIOS E REGRAS DE INTERPRIETAQAO DOS CONTRATOS NO
Novo Cooic;o Civii 23 (3d ed. 2007).
29. IRINEU STRENGER, DIRIffo INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 658 (4th ed. 2000); OSCAR
TENORIO, DiRi-ffo INTERNACIONAL PRIvADo 180-81 (1962).
30. Lei No. 3,071, de I Janeiro de 1916, Didrio Oficial da Unido [D.O.U.] de 5.1.1916
(Braz.). Article 13 reads: "Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, obligations
shall be governed by the law of the country where they were constituted."
31. HAROLDO VALLADAo, DIRUlTO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 363 (3d ed. 1971); JA-
COB DoLcINGER, DiRuirro INTERNACIONAL PRIVAXo 441 (2007); Lauro da Gama
e Souza Jr., Autonomia da Vontade nos Contratos Internacionais no Direito Inter-
nacional Privado Brasileiro: Uma Leitura Constitucional do Artigo 9' da Lei de
Introdupdo ao C6digo Civil em Favor da Liberdade de Escolha do Direito Apli-
cdvel in 0 DiRi--fro INTERNACIONAL CONTIMPORANEO-Esiunos -M
HOMENAGEM AO PROFESSOR JACon DOLINGER 599-626 (Carmen Tiburcio &
Luis Roberto Barroso 2006).
32. ARAUJO, supra note 26, at 342-43. But in the only case decided by the STF con-
cerning the application of article 9 of the LICC to international contracts, the court
acknowledged that the parties had chosen the British law to regulate their con-
tracts because the legal issue was the efficacy of the extra-contractual relationship
between the parties and not the contract itself, the law indicated by article 9 of the
LICC would be the applicable one. As a result, the court applied the Portuguese
law (Recurso Extraordingrio n. 93.131-MG, Segunda Turma, Supremo Tribunal
Federal, Relator: Min. Moreiva Alves (12/17/1981)). Exceptionally, an inferior
court expressly recognized the principle of party autonomy (Agravo de Instru-
mento n. 1.247.070-7, 12a CAmara do lo Tribunal de Algada Cfvel do Estado de Slo
Paulo, Relator: Artur C6sar Beretta da Silveira (12/18/2003)).
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order"33 exception contained in article 17 of LICC.3 4 If a Brazilian court
finds that the law that would be applicable to a legal dispute, as per arti-
cle 9 of LICC, violates essential values of the Brazilian legal system-for
instance, when one party is weaker than the other and the choice-of-law
clause was imposed by the stronger one-it could "trump the LICC's PIL
analysis and apply Brazilian law whenever necessary to avoid unconstitu-
tional or inequitable results."35
In contrast to the position adopted by the Brazilian judicial courts, if
the contractual dispute is to be resolved by an arbitral tribunal, the princi-
ple of party autonomy is fully respected and parties can choose the appli-
cable law, unless it violates good customs or the public order, in
accordance with Brazilian Arbitration Law3 6 and the Mercosur Agree-
ment on International Commercial Arbitration.37 Therefore, arbitration
could be an alternative means of overcoming resistance in Brazil to the
principle of party autonomy to choose the applicable law.3 8
2. Choice-of-Forum Freedom
Aside from the arbitration alternative, parties could act strategically by
choosing a Forum State that respects the parties' choice-of-law free-
dom. 39 This principle is the rule in the United States,40 the European
Union,41 and countries that are members of the Inter-American Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial
33. The public order exception is the civil law analogue to the public policy exception
familiar to common lawyers. For simplicity, the term "public order" will be used in
lieu of "public policy" throughout this thesis.
34. LICC, supra note 23, art. 17. It reads: "The laws, acts and judicial decisions from a
foreign country, as well as any declaration of will, do not have efficacy in Brazil
when they violate the Brazilian sovereignty, the public order and the good
customs.
35. Dana Stringer, Choice of Law and Choice of Forum in Brazilian International
Commercial Contracts: Party Autonomy, International Jurisdiction, and the Emerg-
ing Third Way, 44 CoituM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975 (2005).
36. See Lei No. 9.307, Lei de Arbitragem [Arbitration Law], 23 Julhio 1996, Didrio
Oficial da Uniio [D.O.U.] de 23.9.1996 (Braz.). Article 2, section 1 of the Arbitra-
tion Law reads: "The parties may choose the law that will be applicable to their
case if there is no violation to good customs and to the public order." See also
Agravo 1.111.650-0, Tribunal de Alcada Cfvel de Sao Paulo, 24.09.2002; SEC 349-
EX, STJ, Relator: Min. Eliana Calmon, 21.03.2007.
37. Agreement on International Commercial Arbitration in Mercosur art. 10, July 23,
1998, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSRS/Decisions/dec0398.asp (last visited
Sept. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Mercosur Commercial Arbitration Agreement]. It
reads: "The parties may choose the law that will be applicable to solve their dis-
pute . . . ."
38. Fabio Morosini, A Arbitragem Comercial como Fator de Renovagdo do Direito
Internacional Privado Brasileiro dos Contratos [Commercial Arbitration as a Fac-
tor for the Renewal of the Brazilian Private International Law of Contracts]
REVISTA )OS TRIBUNAls, n. 851 63-85 (2006).
39. ARAUJO, supra note 26, at 337.
40. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
41. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters art. 17, Sept. 27, 1968, 29 I.L.M. 1417, 1422-23 (EC) [hereinafter
1968 Brussels Convention]; Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Rec-
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Validity of Foreign Judgments (1984 La Paz Convention). 42 Parties from
Mercosur's member states are free to choose the jurisdiction that will
solve their contractual disputes, according to the Buenos Aires Protocol
on International Jurisdiction in Contractual Matters (1994 Buenos Aires
Protocol).43
Despite the fact that Brazil is a member of Mercosur and thus subject
to the Buenos Aires Protocol, Brazilian judicial courts, until recently,
would give no force to forum selection clauses. According to Nadia
Aratijo, the courts based their reasoning on a mistaken interpretation of
the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code (C6digo de Processo Civil-C.P.C.), 4 4
which regulates both exclusive 4 5 and concurrent jurisdiction. 4 6 The mis-
conception pertains to the interpretation of article 88 of the C.P.C., which
lays out situations in which Brazil has concurrent jurisdiction, such as
when the defendant resides in Brazil, or when the obligation has to be
performed in Brazil.47 In several decisions, "Brazilian judges have . ..
conceived of their jurisdiction as mandatory rather than discretionary,"
setting aside the forum selection clauses and hearing the cases before
them. 4 8 In addition, Brazilian judicial courts have often treated the
choice-of-forum and the choice-of-law analyses together, conflating
''party autonomy to choose the applicable law" with "party autonomy to
choose the forum," leading to the erroneous presumption that both Bra-
zilian law and Brazilian exclusive jurisdiction should be the norm.4 9
Fortunately, a very recent judicial decision from the Superior Tribunal
of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justica-STJ), Brazil's highest federal
court for all non-constitutional matters, clarified the interpretation of ar-
ticle 88 of the C.P.C. by stating that its concurrent jurisdiction circum-
stances could be avoided by a legally binding contractual clause.50 This
ognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 23,
Dec. 22, 2000, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 8 (EC).
42. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in
the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments art.
1(D), May 24, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 468, 469 (EC), available at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/english/treaties/b-50.html [hereinafter 1984 La Paz Convention]. Brazil
signed the convention, but did not ratify it.
43. Buenos Aires Protocol on International Jurisdiction in Contractual Matters in
Mercosur arts. 4-5, Aug. 5, 1994, 36 I.L.M. 1266, available at http://www.sice.oas.
org/trade/mrcsrs/decisions/AN0194_e.asp.
44. CODIGO D)E PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CivIL PROCEDURE CooL] arts. 88-89
(Braz.).
45. Id. art. 89. It reads: "The Brazilian judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
cases when: I-The lawsuit refers to real state located in Brazil; II-The will is re-
lated to property located in Brazil, even if the deceased was a foreigner and re-
sided abroad."
46. Id. art. 88.
47. Id. It reads: "The Brazilian judiciary has concurrent jurisdiction to hear cases
when: I-The defendant, whatever his nationality, is domiciled in Brazil; II-The ob-
ligation must be performed in Brazil; Ill-The case is based on an incident that took
place or arose from an action taken in Brazil."
48. STRINGER, supra note 35, at 960.
49. ARAU.o, supra note 26, at 340.
50. RESP 1.177.915/RJ, Terceira Turma, STJ, Relator: Min. convocado Vasco Della
Giustina, 13.04.2010.
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decision also acknowledged a previous resolution from the Supreme Fed-
eral Tribunal (Superior Tribunal Federal-STF), Brazil's highest constitu-
tional court, which considers forum-selection clauses valid.51
Therefore, although Brazilian judicial courts do not respect the parties'
right to choose the law applicable to their international sales of goods
contracts, Brazilian parties and their foreign counterparts may select the
law to regulate their affairs by selecting a Brazilian arbitration court or a
foreign court in a country that recognizes this right as the forum to solve
their legal disputes.
Aside from choosing a national domestic sales law to regulate their
affairs, parties can opt for the CISG. They can choose this Convention in
two ways: (1) by selecting the CISG expressly in their contract, or (2)
indirectly, by choosing the law of a contracting state as the applicable law.
Because the CISG is an international convention, after its ratification by
a member state it is internalized in that state as a national law applicable
to international commercial contracts. 52 The domestic sales law remains
in force, but its application is limited to domestic contracts for the sale of
goods. The result is that there are two sales laws within a single legal
system.
If the parties want the domestic sales law of that contracting state in-
stead of the CISG to apply to their contract, they can opt-out of the Con-
vention, as stated in article 6 of the CISG.53 Hence, parties may exclude
the CISG entirely or merely replace "individual provisions by rules of
standard forms and general conditions that satisfy national prerequisites
of validity." 54 But, in order to do so, the choice-of-law clause "must be
carefully drafted."55 For example, if the parties' intention is to adopt the
German domestic sales law, they must choose this rule and state clearly
that the CISG is excluded. If they only state that the law of Germany is
51. The STF S6mula n. 335 (12/13/1963) reads: "A contractual forum selection clause
is valid."
52. Despite the fact that both uniform legislation and international conventions are
methods of legal harmonization, conventions are internalized as national law,
whereas uniform laws are not. Thus, their application is optional.
53. Article 6 of the CISG reads: "The parties may exclude the application of this
Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions". In practice, parties tend to exclude the application of the CISG in
their international commercial contracts even if their countries have ratified the
Convention (KOEHLER, Martin F. "Survey regarding the relevance of the
United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in Legal
Practice and the Exclusion of its Application" (2006), available at http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koehler.html). But the main reasons for this tendency are
not related to the Convention itself. In fact, lawyers, who are the ones who draft
the contracts, exclude the Convention because they have more familiarity with
their domestic law and less acquaintance with the CISG and there is a huge learn-
ing cost associated with becoming familiar with the Convention. Ingeborg
Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG-Successes and Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. Come. L.
463-64 (2009); Lisa Spagnolo, A Glimpse Through the Kaleidoscope: Choices of
Law and the CISG (Kaleidoscope Part 1) 13 VINO13ONA J. INT'L COM. & L. 157
(2009).
54. SARCEVIC, supra note 17, at 5.
55. LARRY A. DIMA-ITfO, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACflNG 236 (2d ed. 2009).
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the governing law, the CISG may still apply to contract formation and the
parties' rights and obligations. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, be-
cause Brazil has not yet ratified the CISG and Brazilian judicial courts do
not recognize the parties' choice-of-law freedom, whenever the Brazilian
judiciary is the forum state of a contractual dispute, it is uncertain
whether the parties' intention to exclude the CISG would be enforceable
or not.
The diagram below outlines the application of the principle of party
autonomy with respect to international sales contracts involving Brazilian
parties:
CHART 1 - APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTY AUTONOMY
WHEN BRAZILIAN PARTIES ARE INVOLVED
Forum State Parties' Choice of Law Applicable Law
(*) And States that do not recognize the principle of party autonomy
B. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES OF THE FORUM
1. PIL Rules and the Determination of the Applicable Law
If the parties to a contract do not express their choice of law before a
dispute arises, the determination of the law applicable will be made ex
post, by a judge, and according to PIL rules of the forum. Usually, PIL
rules concerning contracts point either to the law of the seller's or the
buyer's place of business.56 For instance, the 1980 Rome Convention and
the 1994 Mexico Convention provide that, if the parties had not selected
56. See, e.g., 1980 Rome Convention, supra note 10, art. 4, 1 2.
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the law applicable to their contract, the contract will be governed by the
law of the state with which it is most closely connected.57 In particular,
the 1980 Rome Convention presumes that a contract is more closely con-
nected to the place where the party who is to affect the performance that
is characteristic of the contract,58 usually the seller,59 has her habitual
residence or its central administration. As explained above, if Brazil is
the forum state of a judicial dispute, article 9 of LICC provides that the
law applicable to an international contract is the law where the contract
was entered into.60 The legal presumption is that the contract was per-
fected in the offeror's place of business. 61
Only in exceptional circumstances would a third country law govern
the dispute, herein referred to as the "Third Country Exception." Re-
garding the two Conventions mentioned above, if the characteristic part
of the contract is performed in a third country, e.g., if the seller out-
sources components from a foreign supplier, the law of this country regu-
lates the parties' affairs. The same is true with respect to Brazil if the
parties concluded the contract in a third country, e.g., during a trade fair.
The following chart summarizes the determination of the applicable
law according to PIL rules of the forum state when Brazilian parties are
involved in the transaction:
57. See id.; 1994 Mexico Convention, supra note 10, art. 9.
58. 1980 Rome Convention, supra note 10, art. 4.
59. Usually it is the seller who has to execute the characteristic performance consisting
of the transfer of ownership and the delivery of the goods (ICC Court of Arbitra-
tion-Paris, Arbitral Award No. 8611/HV/JK, Jan. 23, 1997); Landgericht Berlin, n.
102 0 59/97 Germany, Mar. 24, 1998).
60. LICC, supra note 23, art. 9.
61. Note that neither of the two Conventions referred to nor the Brazilian law accepts
the doctrine of renvoi, by which the PIL rules of one state are applied by the forum
state to solve a PIL problem. According to article 15 of the 1980 Rome Conven-
tion, article 17 of the 1994 Mexico Convention, and article 16 of the LICC, the
forum court should consider only the foreign country's substantive law and not its
PIL rules.
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CHART 2 - DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICABLE LAw ACCORDING TO
PIL RULES OF THE FORUM STATE
Forum State Applicable Law
.Brazilian Law
Seller's Place of Business Ffren con
Foreign State* or Brazilian Law
Brazil Buyer's Place of Business
Foreign Law
Third Country**Frig"a
States that have ratified the 1980 Rome Convention or the 1994 Mexico Convention
(**) Exception
2. CISG as the Governing Law
As a general rule, the CISG applies to all contracts for the sale of
goods between parties whose places of business are in different con-
tracting states,62 according to article 1(1)(a) of the CISG.63 If both par-
ties have their places of business in different contracting states, and if
after its ratification the CISG is considered a national law in both con-
tracting states, as explained above, it would make sense to apply the
CISG without resorting to PIL rules of the forum because, presumably,
they would point to the law of one of these states.64 But, as a matter of
fact, the CISG governs the transaction even when PIL rules of the forum
lead to the application of the law of a third State that is not a contracting
state.65
62. A point worth attention is that the CISG has chosen the parties' "place of busi-
ness" instead of their "nationality" to determine its jurisdiction. If the parties have
more than one place of business, "the place of business is that which has the closest
relationship to the contract and its performance" (CISG, supra note 11, art. 10).
But "the fact that the parties have their places of business in different States is to
be disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either from the contract or from
any dealings between, or from information disclosed by, the parties at any time
before or at the conclusion of the contract." CISG, supra note 11, art. 1(2).
63. CISG, supra note 11, art. 1(1)(a). It reads: "This Convention applies to contracts
of sale of goods between parties whose place of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States."
64. Although the CISG's ratification reduces the need to resort to PIL rules of the
forum, it does not mean that PIL analysis is totally excluded. For more informa-
tion, see Franco Ferrari, CISG and Private International Law, in TiEi, 1980 UNI-
FORM SALEs LAw-ODo IssuEs REVisriE IN rinL Lica-rr oi. RECENI
EXPERIENCES 19-55 (2003).
65. "This result could be defeated only if the litigation took place in a third non-Con-
tracting State, and the rules of private international law of that State would apply
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Article 1(1)(b) of the CISG expands the application of the CISG to
situations where one or both parties are not from contracting states, but
PIL rules of the forum point to the application of the law of a contracting
state.66 Despite the fact that non-contracting states are not bound to
CISG provisions,67 the result would be the same when the forum state
has not ratified the CISG, as is the case for Brazil. If the solution pro-
vided by the forum state's PIL rules is that the law of a contracting state
is the applicable one, the CISG will govern the transaction because it is
that country's law for international commercial transactions.
In Brazil, when only one party is from a contracting state, the CISG
may govern the transaction depending on where the contract was con-
cluded, which could be either parties' place of business. 68 If the forum
state is subject to the 1980 Rome Convention or the 1994 Mexico Con-
vention, the CISG may be applied if the contract is more closely con-
nected to a contracting state, which can also be either party's place of
business. 69 By the same token, when none of the parties are from a mem-
ber state, there is no room for CISG application under Brazil's PIL rules
or under the two Conventions, but for the Third Country Exception men-
tioned above.70
The chart below elucidates the situations in which the CISG is applied
by virtue of PIL rules of the forum to transactions involving parties from
Brazil:
the law of the forum." Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, arts. 1(a)-(b), $ 6, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 97/5, at 14-15, cmt. 6 (1979), available at http://www.globalsaleslaw.
org/index.cfm?pagelD=644#Article 1.
66. CISG, supra note 11, art. 1(1)(b). It reads: "This Convention applies to contracts
of sale of goods between parties whose place of business are in different States:
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of
a Contracting State."
67. Lucia Carvalhal Sica, A Convengdo das NaC6es Unidas sobre Contratos de Compra
e Venda Internacional de Mercadorias: Estados Nao Signatdrios e a Situacdo do
Brasil [The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Non-Signatory States and the Situation in Brazil], 31 REvIsTrA TIUMPSTRAL
on Diirro Civn (2007).
68. Cross References and Editorial Analysis: Article 1, § 3 (Franco Ferrari, ed. 1996),
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/cross/cross-1.html.
69. 2008 UNCITRA L Digest of case law on the United Nations Convention on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods: Article 1, 1 21 (Pace Law School Institute of Int'l Com-
mercial Law 2009), available at http://www.cisg.Iaw.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest-art-01.
html.
70. See id. $ 18.
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CHART 3 - CISG APPLICATION ACCORDING TO PIL RULES
OF THE FORUM STATE
Forum State Applicable Law
BrazilaLw
Seller's Place of Business
CISG
3. Cortin Stat Buyer's Place of BusinessningLaBrazil CS__
Third Country**Frig"a
cisG
()States that have ratified the 1980 Rome Convention or the 1994 Mexico Convention
(**) Exception
3. Contracting State Domestic Law as the Governing Law
One of the reservations a member state can make when ratifying the
CISG is the one provided by article 95 of the CISG.71 This reservation
gives the member states the option not to enforce article 1(1)(b) of the
CISG,72 which provides that the CISG will be the applicable law when
PIL rules of the forum refer to the law of a contracting state, even if one
or both parties are not from contracting states. In fact, only a few mem-
ber states, such as the United States and China, have made use of this
exception.73
The practical effects of this reservation are very controversial among
member states, foreign legal writers, and national courts. Particularly,
when the forum state is located in a reservatory state, some authors argue
against the application of the CISG to contracts where one or both par-
ties are from non-contracting states, but the contract is subject to the
71. CISG, supra note 11, art. 95. It reads: "Any State may declare at the time of the
deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it
will not be bound by subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1 of this Convention."
72. The drafters of the CISG included the article 95 reservation because at the time of
the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna many countries heavily criticized article
1(1)(b) of the CISG "on the grounds that it excessively restricts the applicability of
domestic statutes governing the relationships with foreign parties." "The idea be-
hind this reservation was the belief that recourse to private international law be-
comes complex for countries such as the former Czechoslovakia and the German
Democratic Republic that had enacted special codes for international trade"
SARCiVIC, supra note 17, at 8.
73. See CISG, supra note 11.
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CISG by virtue of PIL rules of the forum.7 4 They argue that the only
circumstance in which the CISG could apply is when all parties to the
contract are from contracting states and support this assertion by noting
that reservatory states are only bound to apply the Convention by virtue
of article 1(1)(a) of the CISG.75 This is also the position of the United
States and Chinese governments and their respective national courts.7 6
Other authors affirm that the CISG is only inapplicable when the forum's
PIL rules lead to its own law.77 Consequently, when these rules point to a
law of the contracting state that has not made this reservation, the courts
of the reservatory state should apply the CISG because the CISG is part
of the national law of that contracting state, and not because of article
1(1)(b) of the CISG.
A second point of divergence is the application of article 95 when the
PIL rules of a non-reservatory contracting forum state point to the appli-
cation of the law of a reservatory state. Some scholars are of the opinion
that the CISG should not be applicable in this situation because judges
from the reservatory state would not apply the Convention if they were
to hear the case.78 Germany, which is not a reservatory state, has a more
extreme interpretation of article 95 of the CISG, according to which arti-
cle 1(1)(b) of the CISG would not be applicable when a reservatory state
is involved.79 For example, if Germany is the forum state, one of the
74. See generally Bradley J. Richards, Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
Applicability of the United Nations Convention, 69 IOWA L. REv. 209 (1983); Fran-
cis A. Gabor, Stepchild of the New Lex Mercatoria: Private International Law from
the United States Perspective, 8 Nw. J. INT'l L. & Bus. 538 (1998); Maria del Pilar
Perales Viscasillas, El Contrato de Compraventa Internacional de Mercancias
(Convencion de Viena de 1980), PACE L. SCII. INST. OF INT'L COM. L. (Jan. 11,
2002), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/perales1.html.
75. Bradley J. Richards, Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Applicability of
the United Nations Convention, 69 IowA L. Riv. 209-240 (1983); Francis A.
Gabor, Stepchild of the New Lex Mercatoria: Private International Law from the
United States Perspective, 8 Nw. J. IN['i L. & Bus. 538-560 (1998).
76. Impuls I.D. Internacional, S.L. v. Psion-Teklogix Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 1267 (S.D.
Fla. 2002); Prime Start Ltd. v. Maher Forest Products Ltd. et al. 442 F.Supp.2d
1113 (W.D.Wash. 2006); Zheng Hong Li Ltd. Hong Kong v. Jill Bert Ltd. Swiss,
Supreme Court of the People's Republic of China, July 20, 1999; CIETAC Arbitra-
tion Proceeding (Medical Equipment Case) China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission, Dec. 24, 2004.
77. FERRARI, supra note 64, at 32-33; PETER WINSI-rP, THEii SCOPE OF TiHE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SALES CONrRAcrs, IN MAT-7HIEW BENDER, IN-
TERNATIONAL SAEi-s: TiHE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACE-S FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GooDs, 3-16, 32 (Nina M. Galston and Hans Smit
eds.) (1984).
78. Isaak I. Dore, Choice of Law Under the International Sales Convention: A U.S.
Perspective, AM. J. INT'i L. 538-39 (1983); Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in Interna-
tional Encyclopaedia of Laws-Contracts 1-192 (J. Herbots & R. Blanpain ed.,
Suppl. 29) (2000).
79. Appellate Court Dusseldorf, Case n. 15 U 88/03 (Mobile Car Phones Case), Apr.
21, 2004 (Ger.). In this case, the court applied the CISG because none of the
contracting states had made an article 95 reservation. But the court mentioned
that the outcome would be different if one of the parties were from a reservatory
state.
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parties has its place of business in a non-contracting state, and the other
party has its place of business in the United States, the CISG will not
regulate the parties' affairs. Scholars opposing this interpretation contend
that it is unreasonable for two reasons: one, a reservation of this kind
made by one state cannot bind another state; and, two, all the conditions
for the applicability of the CISG under article 1(1)(b) of the CISG would
have been fulfilled from the standpoint of the forum state.80
Lastly, legal writers also disagree about the impact of the article 95
reservation where the PIL rules of a non-contracting state lead to the law
of a reservatory state. A conservative view holds that the CISG should
not be applied in this situation at all.8 ' But, a more liberal position is that
the CISG should apply, not based on article 1(1)(b) of the CISG, but by
virtue of the CISG being part of the applicable foreign law. 8 2 Unfortu-
nately, there is no case law currently available that supports this view.
The lack of consensus on the interpretation of this reservation certainly
generates considerable legal instability, not only for parties, but also for
courts. Curiously, as a means of reducing the unpredictability in relation
to the applicable law when article 95 of the CISG is in action, the Dutch
legislature created an innovative solution. The Dutch Act that internal-
ized the CISG asks foreign courts from reservatory states to apply this
Convention instead of the Dutch Civil Code whenever the law from the
Netherlands would be applicable as a result of a local PIL rule.83 Evi-
dently, this proposition is not binding on foreign judges, but it signals that
the Dutch legislator favors "a solution which enhances uniformity rather
than one that relies on local Dutch law." 8 4
The chart bellow condenses the above ideas regarding the CISG appli-
cation under the Article 95 reservation:
80. Fr'RRARI, supra note 64, at 34-35.
81. DORE, supra note 78, at 537-38; Jean-Pierre Plantard, Un Nouveau Droit Uniforme
de La Vente Internationale: La Convention des Nations Unies du 11 Avril 1980 [A
New Uniform Rule for International Sales: The United Nations Convention of April
11, 1980] 2 JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 321 (1998).
82. FERRARI, supra note 64, at 35-36; Michel Pelichet, La Vente Internationale de Mar-
chandises et Le Conflit de Lois [The International Sale of Goods and the Conflict of
Laws] 201 RECUEIL DrS COURS ACADEMIE DE1 DRorr INTERNATIONAL 38-39
(1987).
83. See Filip De Ly, Sources of International Sales Law: An Eclectic Model, in CELE-
BRATING SUCCFss: 25 YEARS UNITiD NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF Goo)s 28, 36 (2006), available at http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/dely.html.
84. Id.
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III. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE BRAZILIAN LAW, THE
CISG, AND THE AMERICAN LAW ON FORMATION
OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS FOR
THE SALE OF GOODS
A. CONTRACT FORMATION UNDER BRAZILIAN LAW
1. Legal Tradition and Sources of Law
Until 1822, Brazil was a Portuguese colony. Shortly after the proclama-
tion of independence, a law was enacted maintaining the then-current
Portuguese law as the law of Brazil.85 Despite the fact that these same
rules were totally modified in Portugal a few years later due to liberal
reforms, in Brazil they remained practically untouched until 1916, when
85. The "Ordenacoes Filipinas" (Philippine Compilation), published in 1603, and
other laws and regulations promulgated by the kings of Portugal up until April 25,
1821.
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the first civil code was enacted. 86 The 1916 Code was drafted based on
Roman Law and Portuguese Law, and was influenced by the codes and
institutions of other European countries, especially those of Italy, France,
Germany, and Switzerland.87
In theory, in civil-law countries such as Brazil,88 all laws must have
been previously written and made public, so statutes and comprehensive
codes represent the main source of law. Civil law judges and lawyers,
when confronted with a legal problem, think scholastically and deduc-
tively, first looking for the solution in the generalized and systematic stat-
utory enactments. Even unpredictable problems may be solved by the
existing statutory provisions, because courts may decide on the basis of
analogy, general uses, and practices, or by applying general principles of
law.89
In Brazil, the supreme rule is the Federal Constitution, in force since
October 5, 1988.90 The country is organized as a federative republic in-
spired by the North American model, formed by states, municipalities,
and the federal district.91 Accordingly, the Brazilian legal system is based
on statutes enacted by the appropriate legislative power at the federal,
state, and municipal levels and all laws are ultimately subordinate to the
constitution.92
Under the constitution, the national government has authority to legis-
late on the most important and general issues, including civil and com-
mercial matters. 93 In 2002, after twenty-six years of discussion, the
Brazilian Congress approved a new civil code (Novo Codigo
Civil-C.C.) 94 that revoked the former 1916 Code, as well as the 1850
Commercial Code. The new civil code, which entered into force on Janu-
ary 11, 2003, regulates several aspects of the civil life of persons and cor-
porations, such as legal capacity, obligations, contracts, and torts.95 In
particular, Title V provides rules regarding contracts in general, with
86. See id.
87. Jose Carlos Moreira Alves, A Panorama of Brazilian Civil Law from its Origins to
the Present, in A PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAW 87-105 (Jacob Dollinger & Keith
S. Rosenn eds.) (1992).
88. The Civil Law is a legal tradition ultimately derived from a collection of European
laws also known as Corpus luris Civilis issued from 528 to 534 by order of Justinian
I, Eastern Roman Emperor.
89. KONRAD ZWEIGIRr & HElz Ko-rz, AN INTRODUCION TO COMPARATIVE LAw
69-71 (1998); MiciAEL BOGDAN, COMPARATIVE LAw 84 (1994).
90. See CONSTIUlAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONsTIruION] (Braz.).
91. But the division of powers does not function in Brazil as it does in the United
States. For instance, "presidential power is grossly exaggerated in Brazil" due to
direct elections, the fragility of the political party system, and the lack of prestige
of the Legislature and the Judiciary. Manoel Goncalves Ferreira Filho, Fundamen-
tal Aspects of the 1988 Constitution, in A PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAw 16-20
(Jacob Dollinger & Keith S. Rosenn eds. 1992).
92. For more information on the legislative spheres of authority, see CoNsrrruIAO
FEDERAL [CF.] [CONSTITUTION] arts. 22-25, 30(1)-(II), 32 § 1 (Braz.).
93. CoNsurrueAo FEDERAL [CF.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 22(1) (Braz.). It reads: "The
Federal Government has exclusive power to legislate on: I- civil, commercial . . .
94. See COIio CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] (Braz.).
95. See generally id.
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Chapter I providing the general rules and Chapter II regulating contract
formation.96 In addition, there are several other provisions in the code
that complement the specific rules on contract formation. These provi-
sions must also be examined in order to achieve a better understanding of
the Brazilian law.
The main innovation in contract regulation brought by the 2002 Code is
the establishment of two general clauses. First, the principle of good faith
posits that parties shall observe the principles of honesty and good faith
in the conclusion and performance of the contract. 97 Second, the princi-
ple of social function of the contract states that the parties' freedom of
contract is limited by the social function of the property and the con-
tract.98 In addition, the concepts of "gross disparity"99 and "hardship," 00
which had long been accepted by Brazilian courts and scholars, were fi-
nally introduced in Brazilian statutory law. As a result, "the notion of
contractual justice superseded legal individualism, formerly the exclusive
source of contractual obligations, and now prevails over the absolute ap-
plication of the ancient principle of the pacta sunt servanda."10
Unfortunately, the rules that deal specifically with contract formation
are virtually the same as the ones contained on the 1916 Code, elaborated
almost a century ago. To be more precise, just one provision was added
and none were meaningfully altered. 102 In fact, legislators lost the oppor-
96. See id. arts. 136-44.
97. Id. art. 422. It reads: "The parties are obliged to comply with the principles of
honesty and good faith, not only when the contract is perfected, but also during its
performance." Note that this provision applies both to the pre-contractual and to
the post-contractual phases, according to Enunciado n. 25 of the Jornada de
Direito Civil (STJ-CJF) held in Brasflia/DF, on September 2002. For more infor-
mation on pre-contractual liability, see Ruy RosADo DE Ac;UIAR JR., ExTIN;Ao
DOS CONTRATOS POR INCUMPRIMENTO Do D Evni)OR [TF RM INATION OF CON-
TRACT FOR DEI3TOR'S BREACH] (1991); See CARLYLE Poii, RESPONSABILIDADE
CIVIL PRI-NEGOCIAL: 0 RompiMENTO IDAs TRATATIVAS [PRin-NiGOTIATION LIA-
ILIry: TERMINAToN OF NeaOTIATIONS] (2002).
98. CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL Cori art. 421 (Braz.) reads: "The parties' freedom
of contract shall be exercised by virtue of and limited to the social function of the
contract."
99. Id. art. 157. It reads: "A lesion occurs when a person, under extreme necessity or
due to inexperience, undertakes an obligation manifestly disproportionate to the
value of the other party's obligation."
100. Id. art. 178. It reads: "In contracts of continued or deferred performance, if the
obligation of one of the parties becomes excessively onerous, with an extreme ad-
vantage to the other party, as a result of extraordinary and unforeseeable events,
the debtor may request termination of the contract."
101. Eduardo Grebler, The Convention on International Sale of Goods and Brazilian
Law Are Differences Irreconcilable?, 25 J.L. & COM. 470 (2005).
102. CoDIO CIVIL [C.C.J [CIVIL Coij] arts. 427-35 (Braz.). The provisions on contract
formation are contained in Title V, Chapter I, Section 11 of the Brazilian Civil
Code, specifically in these articles. Among these provisions, only article 429 of the
Civil Code (about offers to the general public) is a new rule. The others reflect
almost exactly the 1916 Civil Code rules. For a comparison (in Portuguese) be-
tween the 2002 Civil Code and the 1916 Civil Code, see SjcecRETARIA Esi~rcIA ])I
EDETORACAO E PU3LICAC0ES [DEPARTMENT OF PUBLISHING AND PUBLaICATIONS],
C6digo Civil Quadro Comparativo 1916/2002 [Civil Code Comparative Chart 1916/
2002], (2003), http://www2.senado.gov.br/bdsflbitstream/id/70309/2/704509.pdf.
2011] 507
508 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
tunity to rectify some inaccuracies (inaccuracies that will be pointed out
in the following sections) and comprise new technological developments
such as electronic communications.
Doctrinal teachings in Brazil, like in other civil law countries, are
widely treated by judges as a quasi-authoritative source of law, particu-
larly in cases where the legal solution is not obvious on the face of the
code. 103 Some scholarly writings are even considered more influential
than court decisions.
But this does not mean that case law is treated as irrelevant. It is true
that the general law in civil law countries is that judges can only apply
existing statutory law and have no power to create new legal rules. Con-
sequently, judicial decisions are only binding on the parties involved in
the particular judicial dispute. Moreover, lower courts are not required
to follow previous rulings from higher courts, which may have persuasive
authority at best. For this reason, case law is considered a "secondary"
source of law.104 This approach contrasts with the common law system,
where judges can essentially make up the law in a case of "first impres-
sion" and, if a higher court within the same jurisdiction has already dealt
with the issue, judges are obliged to follow the precedent decision (doc-
trine of "stare decisis"). These differences will be more clearly explained
in section III.C.1 in a discussion of the U.S. legal tradition.
In spite of the fact that Brazil is a civil law country, Brazilian trial
judges are not completely unaffected by precedents set by higher courts.
A 2004 constitutional reform introduced a similar mechanism to the
"stare decisis" called "Sdimula Vinculante."105 Accordingly, the Supreme
Federal Tribunal can, upon motion made by specific authorities or by its
own motion, after multiple decisions on constitutional matters, publish
legal statements that are binding on the court itself and on all lower
courts.10 6 These statements comprise the current understanding of the
court on the issue and are usually only one sentence long. As of Decem-
ber 2010, the Supreme Federal Tribunal has issued thirty-one Samulas
103. In fact, according to Dana Stringer, "Brazilian judges sometimes quote the textual
interpretations of esteemed law professors verbatim to dispose of a case."
Stringer, supra note 35, at 965.
104. This fact is an "entirely logical consequence of the Brazilian judiciary's
subordinate relationship to the legislative branch." Stringer, supra note 35, at 966.
"Brazil is ... heir to the civil law tradition in which the doctrine of separation of
powers denies the judiciary the ability to make law and refuses to consider judicial
decisions as binding precedents." Keith S. Rosenn, Civil Procedure in Brazil 34
AM. J. CoMr. L. 487, 513 (1986).
105. See CONsTIrruICAo FEDERAL [CF.] [CONSTITUTION] amend. 45 (Braz.).
106. Id. art. 103-A. It reads, "the Supreme Federal Court shall have the power to, by its
own initiative or by provocation, by means of a decision taken by two thirds of
their members, after reiterated decisions about constitutional matters, approve a
summary which, after publication in official gazette, shall have binding effect over
the other bodies of the Judiciary Power and over the direct and indirect public
administration, at federal, State and municipal levels, as well as proceed to their
revision or cancelling, in the manner provided for in law;" see also Lei No. 11.417,




Although other tribunals can also publish "Samulas" stating the sum-
mary of their understanding on a subject matter, currently, only the court
that issued the statement is bound by its own "Samulas." Nevertheless,
very recently, the Brazilian Senate proposed a bill to review the Brazilian
Civil Procedure Code,108 making all "Stimulas" binding on lower courts,
thus, expanding the rule of precedent. This bill is still being analyzed by
the Brazilian National Congress.
2. Proposal
The proposal is the first step towards contract formation. Brazilian
scholars define it as a unilateral declaration of will that one party, the
promisor or offeror, makes to the other party, the promisee or offeree,
looking forward to entering into a contractual relationship.109 It can be
either express (in writing or orally) or tacit (implied on unequivocal ac-
tions), as any unilateral declaration of will." 0 Moreover, it can be di-
rected to specific persons or to the general public."'
In order to be binding, however, a proposal must be complete and seri-
ous. 1 12 A complete proposal is one that has all the necessary terms to
form the contract. Specifically, for contracts for the sale of goods, the
proposal must indicate both the goods to be sold and the price. 113 The
107. See generally SOMULAS VINCULANTES [BINDING PRECEDENT] (Supremo Tribunal
Federal) [Supreme Federal Tribunal], http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp
?servico=jurisprudenciaSumulaVinculante (last updated Feb. 24, 2011, 17:18:33).
108. Projeto de Lei do Senado No. 166 de 8 de junho de 2010, available at http://www.
senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=82260&tp= 1.
109. See I MARIA HELENA DINIz, TRATAiDO TEORICO E PRATICO DOS CONTRATOS
[CONTRAr TiEiORY AND) PRACFlCE7] 80 (5th ed. 2003); 3 CARLos ROBlERTO GON-
CAL VIS, DIREITO CIVIL BRASILEIRO: CONTRATOS E ATos UNIILA-ITERAIS [BRAZIL-
IAN CIVIL LAW: CONTRACIS AND UNILATERAL Acrs] 51 (3d ed. 2007); 3
RODRIGiUIs, supra note 27, at 70-71; 3 CAIO MARIO DA SILVA PEREIRA, INSTIU-
ICIoiS i DIRrro CivIl: CONTRATOS [INSTITUTIONS OF CIVIL LAw: CONTRACIS]
(2006).
110. CODIco CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CoDE] art. 107 (Braz.) reads: "The validity of decla-
rations of will do not depend upon a special form, except when the law expressly
requires it."
111. Id. art. 429. It reads: "An offer to the public is equivalent to a proposal when it
has all its essential requirements, unless if, from the circumstances and the uses, it
results otherwise."
112. See JOAO MANUEL 11E CARVALIIO SANTOS, COIG)O CIVIL BRASILEIRO INTEIR-
PRFTADO, PRINCIPALMENTE DO PONTO 1DE VISTA PRATICO [BRAZILIAN CIVIL
CODE INTERPRETIED PRIMARIL.Y TIiROUGII A PRACIlCAL VIFwrOINT] 60-61 (11th
ed. 1986); ARNALoo RizzARDO, CONTRATOS [CONTRAc-rs] 47 (2005); 1 DINIZ
supra note 109, at 82; 3 GONCALVES supra note 109, at 51-52.
113. CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE.] art. 482 (Braz.) reads: "The purchase and sale,
when unconditional, is considered as obligatory and perfected from the time that
the parties agree upon the object and price." See also 1 DINIz supra note 109, at
82; CEZAR PELUSO ET.AL., C6uiGo CIVIL COMENTADo, DOUTRINA E JURIS-
PRUDIENCIA [COMMENTARY, DoCERINE, AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THIE CIVIl
Corn] 473 (3d ed. 2009); Apelaq8o Civel 70030681324,20' Cimara Cfvel, Tribunal
de Justiga do Rio Grande do Sul, Relator: Jose Aquino Flores de Camargo (10/21/
2009); Apelaqdo 99206115776, 30' C~mara de Direito Privado do Tribunal de Jus-
tiga de Sho Paulo, Relator: Edgard Rosa (06/16/2010).
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goods may be either determined or determinable,' 14 and the price may be
fixed by an arbiter chosen by the parties, by the market, by indices, or
according to the seller's average sales prices. 5
A serious proposal is one that is made with the intention to be binding
in case of acceptance. In a proposal, as in all declarations of will, the real
intent of the party making the declaration is more important than the
literal meaning of the words expressed by her.116 But if the offeror does
not intend to be bound by the offer, and does not reveal this desire, the
proposal is binding, unless the offeree knew about the offeror's true
intentions.' 17
According to article 427, first part of the C.C.,' 18 the proposal binds the
offeror.n 9 A literal interpretation of this rule would make it plausible for
one to conclude that the proposal becomes effective just after its formula-
tion, even though it was not dispatched by the offeror or received by the
offeree. 120 But in accordance with article 428 (IV) of the C.C.,1 2 1 the
offer would be binding only after the offeree has knowledge of it, because
a dispatched offer can be withdrawn by the offeror if the withdrawal is
received by the offeree before or at the same time she learns about the
offer.12 2 In this event, both unilateral declarations of will (offer and with-
drawal) invalidate each other reciprocally for being contradictory. 123
Nevertheless, in some situations the law does not consider a proposal
obligatory. Article 427, second part of the C.C.1 2 4 provides that a propo-
sal is not binding: (i) if it indicates that the offeror had no intention to be
114. See CoDio CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CoDI] arts. 243-46 (Braz.); See 3 PERE1iIRA supra
note 109.
115. See CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [Civil Con] arts. 485-89 (Braz.).
116. Id. art. 112. It reads: "In declarations of will, the intention rather than the literal
sense of the language shall be observed."
117. Id. art. 110. It reads: "The declaration of will survives despite the fact that the
declarant had no intention to be bound by his declaration, unless the recipient had
knowledge about the declarant's real intent."
118. Id. art. 427. It reads: "The offer of the contract obligates the offeror."
119. See 3 MARIA HELENA DINIz, CuiRso DE Dmerro Civii BRASILEIO [Ti
COURSE o BRAZILIAN CivIL LAw] 46-49 (1997).
120. See MANOEL IGNACIO CARVA110 DE MENDONCA, DOUTRINA 1 PRATICA DAS
OBRIGAGOlES OU TRATADO GERAL cos DiAfros DE CREDITO [DOCERINE AND
PRAClCE OF LIABILITIES OR GENIRAL CONTRACIS OF CREir RIGFrTs] 650
(1908).
121. CoiGo Clvii [C.C.] [CIviL Coi] art. 428(IV) (Braz.) reads: "The offer ceases to
be obligatory: ... (IV) if, before reply, or simultaneously with it, the proponent's
retraction comes to the knowledge of the other party;" Apelaqio Cfvel 590074357,
5a CAmara Cfvel, Tribunal de Justiga do Rio Grande do Sul, Relator: Ruy Rosado
de Aguiar Jr. (11/14/1990).
122. According to the prominent scholar Pontes de Miranda, the recipient learns about
the declaration of will when enough time has lapsed for her to become aware of
the content of the message if regular means of communication were employed 2
PONTES DE MIRANDA, TRATADO DE DIREffO PRIVADO [CONTIRACI OF PNIVATE7
RIGHTr] 457, 464 (2000).
123. See 3 PEREIRA, supra note 109.
124. CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 427 (Braz.). The second part reads: "[I]f
the contrary does not result from the terms of it, or from the nature of the busi-
ness, or from the circumstances of the case."
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bound (for example, if it contains terms such as "nonbinding proposal" or
"draft"), which seems coherent in light of the conditions of a binding of-
fer, described above, (ii) depending on the nature of the transaction (for
instance, if the offer is directed to several persons and there is a stock
limitation, the offeror is not obliged to enter into a contract with every-
one that answers the offer, but only with the first ones until all the goods
are sold), and (iii) depending on the circumstances of the case. Regard-
ing this last exception, the law gives no additional explanation and schol-
ars diverge on its meaning. This provision may suggest that judges would
be free to apply it according to each case 125 or it may refer to the next
rule pertaining to a proposal's termination.126 As a logical statutory in-
terpretation of the C.C., the former viewpoint makes more sense.127
Even though the Brazilian Civil Code does not expressly regulate revo-
cability of offers, an effective offer would always be revocable by the
promisor, even when there is a fixed time for its validity.128 Taking into
account the fact that, under Brazilian law, a contract is a "meeting of
wills" and no agreement can be reached between the parties if one of the
wills no longer exists, both Brazilian scholars and courts understand that
the offeror can cancel an offer until an effective acceptance has been
made. 129 Contrariwise, several scholars are of the opinion that the death
of the offeror cannot revoke the proposal even though one of the wills is
no longer present. In that event, the proposal, as any legal obligation, is
transmitted to the offeror's heirs, who would assume the liability for any
damage experienced by the offeree. 30
Despite the fact that Brazilian law admits some kinds of unilateral dec-
larations of will to be irrevocable, it is not clear whether the offeror, by
herself and not by force of law, would be able to make an irrevocable
offer.131 But an offer would be irrevocable if the offeree relies that the
proposal would be kept open. In this situation, because the contract was
125. See IV PAnto Si-oinz GAGIANO & Rot 1)otro PAMPLONA Fi -io, Novo Cuzso
DE DiRtwro Cvil [A Niw CouiRsiE FoiR CiviL- LAw] 87 (2d ed. 2006).
126. See, e.g., CARVALHO SANTOS supra note 112, at 66; RIZZAWoo supra note 112, at
49; 1 DINIZ supra note 109, at 83; 3 GONCALVs supra note 109, at 53; 3 PAULO
NADER, CURSO DI DE IRrffo CiviL [Tin, Counise, joRi Civit LAw] 55 (2008); See 3
PERERA supra note 109.
127. If the second part of article 427 of the C.C. deals with situations in which the
proposal is not obligatory (and was never obligatory) and article 428 of the C.C. is
concerned with proposals that were obligatory (according to the first part of article
427), but for any of the authorized reasons, ceased to be mandatory, they cannot
be related.
128. CAIZvAIu0to SANTOs supra note 112, at 76-77; DARcy BE SSONE, Do CONTRA'ro-
TroiUA GEixRAL [GENERAL TiHEORY OF CONTRAcr] 126-28 (4th ed. 1997).
129. MIRANDA, supra note 122, at 476; RrzzARDo, supra note 112 at 51; Apelagio
9940509780, 2' Turma Civel do Tribunal de Justiga de Sio Paulo, Relator: Elliot
Akel, 09.02.2010.
130. MIRANDA, supra note 122, at 476; CARVALH1-O DE MENDONCA, supra note 120, at
532; WASHINGTON D)E BARROS MorjTIRo, CuRzso DE DIREfTO CivIL: DIREITO
DAS OtBRIGACOEs, 2^ PARTE [THiF CouRs3 oF Civit LAw: LAw OP LIAIILYH1E1-itS,
SECOND PART] 14-15 (24th ed. 1990); 3 GONCALVEs, supra note 109, at 53. But see
CARvAL io SANTos, supra note 112, at 70.
131. 2 MIRANDA, supra note 122, at 466.
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not formed yet, the promisee would have no right to specific perform-
ance, but the promisor would be liable for damages suffered by the other
party. 132
Regarding offers made to the general public, article 429 of the C.C.133
expressly provides that they can be revoked if the offer contained such
expression and the revocation follows the same means of communication
employed in the offer. Because this provision does not state the time
limit within which a public offer can be revoked, it is possible to infer that
offers made to the general public are revocable anytime until an effective
acceptance has been made.
Article 428 of the C.C. also refers to other specific circumstances in
which a previously binding proposal is terminated and loses its compul-
sory effect. This rule distinguishes between offers made in the presence
of the offeree (inter praesentes) and offers made in her absence (inter
absentes). Interestingly, the law considers as being present persons nego-
tiating over the phone or by similar means of communication in which the
acceptance succeeds the offer without any interruption 34 (such as chat
rooms, skypeTM, or teleconference).1 3 5 In contrast, if the parties discuss
the terms by mail or any other form of communication without direct and
immediate contact, they are viewed by Brazilian law as absent persons. 136
Article 428(I)-(III) of the C.C.137 states that: (i) a proposal made in per-
son without a fixed time for acceptance is terminated immediately if not
accepted; (ii) a proposal made to an absent person without a fixed time
for acceptance is terminated after a sufficient time has lapsed (the law
limits this period to the time necessary for the offeror to be informed
about the acceptance, which can vary according to the circumstances of
the case); and (iii) a proposal made to an absent person with a fixed time
for acceptance is terminated after the pre-determined time has lapsed
without acceptance.
Article 428 is silent with regard to two other possible situations: (i) a
firm proposal that is made in person and (ii) a rejection of the proposal
132. 1 DINIZ, supra note 109, at 84; 3 RODRIGUEs, supra note 27, at 71; IV GAuLIANO,
supra note 125, at 87.
133. C6mioo Civil [C.C.] [Civit COiE] art. 429(1) (Braz.). It reads: "The offer is
revocable by the same means it was published, provided that this right was ex-
pressed in the offer."
134. CAIZvAI-110 DE MENDONCA, supra note 120, at 708.
135. See IV GAGLANO, supra note 125, at 89; GONCALVES, supra note 109, at 54. Note
that not all scholars share this opinion. For instance, Arnaldo Rizzardo under-
stands that communications by fax and e-mail are made in person. RIZZARDO,
supra note 112, at 50.
136. IV GAGIANO, supra note 125, at 89; GONCALVns, supra note 109, at 54; See 3
PERmIRA, supra note 109.
137. CO(;oo Civii [C.C.] [Civii. CoDE] art. 428(l)-(1ll) (Braz.). It reads: "The offer
ceases to be obligatory: (1) if, being made without time limit, to a person present,
it was not immediately accepted. It is considered also as present a person who
contracts by telephone or similar means; (II) if, being made without time limit to a
person absent, sufficient time has elapsed for the reply to come to the knowledge
of the offeror; (III) if, made to a person absent, he has not forwarded the reply
within the time given . . . ."
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by the offeree. In relation to the first situation, it would be logical to
infer that this kind of proposal should be subject to the same treatment as
a firm proposal made to an absent person, which is terminated when the
prescribed time has lapsed. It would also be reasonable to conclude that
a rejected offer should end after it is dismissed by the offeree. But be-
cause there is no statutory provision on this issue, one could maintain that
an offer remains open even after it has been rejected by the offeree, who
would still be able to accept the offer at a later time.
3. Acceptance
The acceptance is the second and final step in the process of contract
formation. It is defined as a unilateral declaration of will that one party,
the offeree, makes to the other party, the offeror, adhering integrally to a
previous offer within the time period given.138
As a general rule, the acceptance can be express or implied from the
offeree's conduct, unless the offeror has required a special form for ac-
ceptance.139 But in some situations the law presumes that the offeree has
accepted the proposal provided that no refusal was received within the
stated time. Article 432 of the C.C.14 0 assumes that an offer is accepted
if: (i) the transaction is of a kind that does not usually require express
acceptance (for example, if the parties had established a practice in this
sense) or (ii) the offeror has released the offeree from having to give an
express acceptance. Regarding the first situation, the rule straightfor-
wardly mirrors article 111 of the C.C.,141 which applies to every unilateral
declaration of will. The second situation, on the other hand, has been
greatly criticized by Brazilian scholars, who argue that it would allow the
offeror to act abusively, binding the offeree without her real accept-
ance.142 These scholars prefer to interpret this provision as limited to a
few situations already accepted by Brazilian society. 143
Considering that an effective acceptance creates a binding contract be-
tween the offeror and the offeree, it binds not only the latter, but also the
138. 1 DINIz, supra note 109, at 85; GONCALV's, supra note 109, at 56; 3 RoDRIGUEs,
supra note 27, at 72; Apelaqdo 992080054845, 25' C^mara de Direito Privado do
Tribunal de Justiga de Sro Paulo, Relator: Antonio Benedito Ribeiro Pinto,
10.06.2010.
139. See CODIGO CivIL [C.C.] [CiviiL CoiE] art. 107 (Braz.); 3 Miranda, supra 122, at
194.
140. COIGo CivIL [C.C.] [CiviL CoiD] art. 432 (Braz.). It reads: "If the business is
one of those in which an express acceptance is not customary, or the proponent
has dispensed with it, the contract is deemed closed, if the refusal does not arrive
in time."
141. Id. art. 111. It reads: "Silence is considered acceptance when the circumstances
and the uses authorize and an express declaration of will is not required."
142. NADR, supra note 126, at 59; CARVAuHo SANTOS, supra note 96, at 112.
143. All scholars who share this opinion give as an example of a situation already ac-
cepted by Brazilian society an illustration provided by Clovis Bevilaqua relating to
hotel accommodations reservations, which is out of date in light of today's method
of online booking. 4 Ciovis BiVILAQUA, CODIGO CivIL Dos EsoADOS UNIoos
)o BRASIL COMENTADO [COMMENT ON THI CIVIL CODE OF THE UNITED STATES
oF BRAzir], 4/246 (2nd ed. 1924).
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former.14 4 As a result, the determination of the moment when an accept-
ance becomes effective is crucial for contract formation and for the de-
limitation of the parties' rights and remedies in case of repudiation by
either of the parties.
In spite of the relevance of the issue, Brazilian law does not expressly
determine the moment an acceptance becomes effective. But article 434,
caput of the C.C.145 suggests that acceptance would be effective upon its
being sent to the offeror. Alternatively, the acceptance would be binding
only after it is received by the offeror because a dispatched acceptance
can be withdrawn by the offeree if the withdrawal is received by the of-
feror prior to or simultaneously with the acceptance, according to article
433 of the C.C.146 Brazilian scholars disagree on which approach is the
correct one. The whole academic discussion is presented in section
III.A.5, in an analysis of the moment of contract formation.
Moreover, an acceptance must be timely to be effective. 1 4 7 Thus, a
proposal has to be accepted before it loses its compulsory effect, in order
to hold. If the acceptance reaches the offeror when the proposal has al-
ready been terminated, she is not bound to the proposal and, therefore,
no contract is formed.148 In this situation, the late acceptance is consid-
ered a counter-offer, as will be explained in section III.A.4. But as stated
by article 430 of the C.C.,14 9 if the acceptance is sent before the expira-
tion of the time limit, but, for unforeseen circumstances, it does not reach
the offeror on time, she must, without delay, inform the offeree of this
fact; otherwise she may be liable for any damage suffered by the offeree
in reliance on the "agreement."
4. Counter-Offer
As mentioned above, an acceptance is only effective if it is made in a
timely manner and conforms integrally to the offer. Therefore, a state-
ment that purports to be an acceptance but is made after the time limit
for acceptance given by the offeror or that has additional or different
terms is considered a counter-offer, according to article 431 of the C.C.50
144. DINIZ, supra note 109, at 85; 3 RoDIGurs, supra note 109, at 74; Apelaq~o
991010125168, 20' Camara de Direito Privado do Tribunal de Justiga de Sio Paulo,
Relator: Carlos Vieira Von Adamek, 06.04.2010.
145. CODIGO Civit [C.C.] [CIVIL Coon] art. 434 (Braz.). It reads, caput: "Contracts
made between absent persons become perfected from the sending of the accept-
ance . . . ."
146. Id. at 433. It reads: "The acceptance is considered as non-existent, if before it or
with it, the retraction of the offeree reaches the offeror." Note that this provision
is very similar to article 428, which is related to a proposal's withdrawal. See id.
art. 428(IV).
147. See id. art. 431.
148. See id. art. 433.
149. Id. art. 430. It reads: "If the acceptance, by an unforeseen circumstance, comes
late to the knowledge of the proponent, she shall communicate it immediately to
the offeree, under penalty of responding for losses and damages."
150. Id. art. 433. It reads: "An acceptance that is tardy, with additions, restrictions, or
modifications, amounts to a new offer."
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Even an accessory and non-material alteration would disqualify the state-
ment as an acceptance. 51 As a result, it can be said that the Brazilian
Civil Code adopts the old common law "mirror image rule," in which the
acceptance must mirror the proposal.152
Furthermore, a counter-offer would require a subsequent acceptance
by the offeror to form the contract, inverting the positions of the original
offeror and offeree.153 Therefore, the chronological order of communica-
tions exchanged by the parties will determine if their responses act as
offers or as counter-offers. If the counter-offer is not accepted by the
other party, there is no contract, and thus, performance is not required. 154
In the event that the original offeror does not object to the new terms
included in the counter-offer and starts performance, Brazilian courts
have understood that the offeror has tacitly agreed with the counter-of-
fer, and, therefore, the contract was formed under the original offeree's
terms. 55 Foreign scholars call this the "last shot rule."156
5. Moment of Contract Formation
The moment a contract is formed is relevant in determining when it
becomes binding and when the parties are obliged to perform their con-
tractual commitments; one to pay the price, and the other to deliver the
goods. As a consequence, none of the parties would be able to terminate
the contract unilaterally, unless by breaching it. In that event, the other
party would be entitled to either specific performance or damages.' 57
There are no controversies regarding the moment a contract is formed
in cases when the parties are negotiating in person and no fixed term for
acceptance was given. Indeed, as stated by article 428(I) of the C.C., be-
cause a proposal made in person loses its compulsory effect just after it is
made, the offeree has to accept it immediately. 58 As a result, the con-
151. CARVALHIO SANTOs, supra note 112, at 106-10; Apelagao Civel n. 589.077.106, V
Camara Cfvel do Tribunal de Justiga do Rio Grande do Sul, Relator: Tupinambi
Miguel Castro do Nascimento, 06.03.1990.
152. See CODIGO Civil [C.C.] [Civil CoDiE] art. 341 (Braz.).
153. DINIz, supra note 109, at 87; 3 NADER, supra note 126, at 58; 3 FAI3IO ULIHOA
Coti o, CuRso 131 DIR AIro CiviL [TiFI- COURSE FOR Civil LAw] 82 (2005).
154. Tapelaq~o Civel n. 70012808200, 16' Camara Civel do Tribunal de Justiga do Rio
Grande do Sul, Relator: Paulo Augusto Monte Lopes, 28.09.2005; Apelagio n.
992090506307, 29' Camara de Direito Privado do Tribunal de Justiga de Sao Paulo,
Relator: Reinaldo Caldas, 28.07.2010; Apelaqio n. 992080054845, 25' Camara de
Direito Privado do Tribunal de Justiga de Sao Paulo, Relator: Antonio Benedito
Ribeiro Pinto, 10.06.2010; Apelaqio com Revisdo 992060488009, 34' Camara de
Direito Privado do Tribunal de Justiga de Sao Paulo, Relator: Emanuel Oliveira,
03.06.2009.
155. Apelagio sem Revisdo 439680, 8a Camara do Extinto 10 Tribunal de Alcada Civel
de Sao Paulo, Relator: Narciso Orlandi, 19.10.1995; Apelago com Revisdo
992020158776, 3- Camara do Segundo Grupo do Tribunal de Justiga de Sao Paulo
(Extinto 2o Tribunal de Algada Civel), Relator: Antonio Ribeiro, 12.12.2003.
156. See, e.g., 77A C.J.S. Sales § 65 (2011).
157. See CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [Civil PROCEDURE CODE] art. 461
(Braz.).
158. CoDolo CivIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CoDE] art. 428(I) (Braz.).
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tract is formed with the acceptance. Notwithstanding, if the parties are
not negotiating face to face and there is an interval between the proposal
and the acceptance, the determination of the moment a contract is
formed becomes highly disputable.
Scholars around the world have developed two opposing theories to
explain contract formation among absent parties.159 The first one is the
Cognition Theory, which understands that a contractual relationship is
only formed when the offeror becomes aware of the offeree's accept-
ance.160 In other words, it is necessary that the offeror has read the ac-
ceptance letter. Accordingly, the offeree would be able to withdraw the
acceptance until that specific moment.
The second is the Declaration Theory, which supports the notion that a
contract is formed when the offeree declares her acceptance.16 1 This the-
ory has three variations. First, the Declaration Theory in the strict sense
states that a contract is formed when the offeree formulates a statement
accepting the offer.162 The problems with this sub-theory are that a con-
tract would be formed even if the offeree never sends her acceptance to
the offeror, and the offeree would never be able to withdraw her accept-
ance after declaring it. Both situations seem very odd. Second, the Dis-
patch Theory (also known as the common law mailbox rule) supports that
contract formation happens when the acceptance is mailed by the of-
feree.163 In this situation, the cutoff point for withdrawal would be the
act of posting the letter. Last, the Receipt Theory sustains that a contract
is only formed after the acceptance is received by the offeror, and there-
fore until that moment the offeree would be able to withdraw her
acceptance. 164
Article 434, caput of the C.C.165 expressly embraces the Dispatch The-
ory, stating that, as a general rule, an acceptance would be effective when
sent to the offeror. But some Brazilian scholars are critical of this rule.16 6
In their view, the theory adopted in reality by the Brazilian law is the
Receipt Theory.167 Their understanding is based on a logical statutory
interpretation of article 433 of the C.C., which provides that a dispatched
acceptance can be withdrawn by the offeree if the withdrawal is received
159. For more information, see CARVAIo 13e MENDONCA, supra note 120, at 715-17;
RIZZARDO, supra note 112, at 61; 1 DINIz, supra note 109, at 89.





165. CooilO CIvIL [C.C.] [Cvin- Con] art. 434 (Braz.). It reads: "Contracts made
between absent persons become perfected from the sending of the acceptance,
except: I- in the case of the preceding Article [when the offeree receives the of-
feror's retraction before sending her acceptance]; 11- if the proponent has agreed
to await a reply; III- if it does not arrive within the time agreed."
166. CARVAIo SANTOS, supra note 112, at 121-23; GONCA v17s, supra note 109, at 59-
60; IV GAGI1ANO, supra note 125, at 95-96.
167. RiZZARoo, supra note 112, at 57; 3 RODRIGUBS, supra note 27, at 74-75; IV GAG-
LIANO, supra note 125, at 93.
CONTRACT FORMATION
by the offeror before or simultaneously with the acceptance.168 Because
all contracts are potentially subject to withdrawal, it is plausible to con-
clude that a contract would only be formed after an acceptance becomes
irrevocable; in other words, after the acceptance is received by the of-
feror. Furthermore, article 430 of the C.C. establishes that an acceptance
that was mailed within the fixed time, but that, for reasons that were out
of the offeree's control, did not reach the offeror on time, is not binding if
the offeree, without delay, communicates this fact to the offeree. In this
situation, the fact that the acceptance was mailed by the offeree within
the time limit is irrelevant for contract formation. What matters is the
reception of the acceptance by the offeror. The code only imposes on the
offeror the obligation to inform the offeree about the delayed acceptance
to avoid the offeree's reliance on the "agreement," in accordance with
the general principle of good faith.' 69
In spite of these strong arguments, the majority of Brazilian scholars
understand that article 434 of the C.C. is the general rule and that articles
433 and 430 of the C.C. are exceptions within that rule.170 Therefore, in
their opinion, the Dispatch Theory would be the norm and the Receipt
Theory the exception.
6. Place of Contract Formation
The place where a contract was formed is a decisive factor in determin-
ing the law applicable to an international contract, as explained in section
II, as well as the usages and parameters of good faith to be applied when
interpreting the contract.' 7 ' Article 435 of the C.C.'7 2 establishes that,
unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the contract is presumed to be
formed in the place where the proposal was made. This provision is com-
plemented by article 9(2) of the LICC, which presumes that the contract
is perfected in the offeror's place of business. 73
Despite that fact, article 435 of the C.C. and article 9(2) of the LICC
contradict article 434, caput of the C.C. and the Dispatch Theory. As
discussed in section III.A.5, article 434, caput of the C.C. provides that
168. CARVAI-o 1DE MENDONCA, supra note 120, at 719; CARVAIo SANTOS, supra
note 112, at 114-15; RIZZARoo, supra note 96, at 63; See 3 PEREIRA, supra note
109; 1 DINIZ, supra note 109, at 90; 3 RoRicuis, supra note 27, at 76; 3 NADER,
supra note 126, at 60; MONTIRO, supra note 130, at 20.
169. CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 113 (Braz.). It reads: "Legal transactions
shall be interpreted according to parameters of good faith and usages from the
place where they were perfected."
170. CARVAI-11O D3E MENDONCA, supra note 120, at 719; CAIVALIHO SANTOS, supra
note 112, at 114-15; RIZZARoo, supra note 112, at 63; See 3 PEREIRA, supra note
109; 1 DINIZ, supra note 109, at 90; 3 RODRIGU-S, supra note 27, at 76; 3 NADER,
supra note 126, at 60; MONrEIRO, supra note 130, at 20.
171. CODIGO CivIL [C.C.] [CivI CoDE] art. 113 (Braz.). It reads: "Legal transactions
shall be interpreted according to parameters of good faith and usages from the
place where they were perfected."
172. Id. art. 435. It reads: "The contract is reputed to be made in the place in which it
was proposed."
173. Agravo de Instrumento 994092880963, 3' C~mara de Direito Privado do Tribunal
de Justiga de Sdo Paulo, Relator: Egidio Giacoia, 10.12.2009.
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the contract is formed when the acceptance is mailed by the offeree. If
the contract is formed at that moment, a logical conclusion would be that
it is formed in the place where the offeree is located when posting her
acceptance. Contrariwise, article 435 of the C.C. and article 9(2) of the
LICC assume that a contract is formed elsewhere, specifically, in the of-
feror's place of business.174 This analysis of article 435 of the C.C. and
article 9(2) of the LICC fortifies the minority's view regarding the code's
adoption of the Receipt Theory inasmuch as it, and not the Dispatch The-
ory, considers the contract formed when the acceptance is received by the
offeror, in what can be supposed to be her place of business.175
7. Formal Requirements
Pursuant to article 107 of the C.C., a contract is not subject to any re-
quirement as to form, unless the law expressly provides otherwise.17 6 Re-
garding contracts for the sale of goods, the law does not determine any
specific form, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.' 77 This means
that contracts for the sale of goods can be evidenced not only by a written
document but also by confession, witness, presumption, and expert
opinions. 78
Nevertheless, the possibility of proving the existence of a contract ex-
clusively with witnesses' 79 or presumptions' 80 is limited to contracts
amounting to no more than ten times the minimum wage in Brazil at the
time the contract was entered into. In contrast, a written document
signed by the parties proves the existence of an agreement regardless of
the amount involved 181 Importantly, if the document is written in a for-
eign language, it must be translated to Portuguese to be legally valid in
174. Piuso, supra note 113, at 473.
175. Carlos Roberto Gongalves sees no problem with article 435 of the C.C. because he
understands that the C.C. has adopted the Receipt Theory. GONCAvns, supra
note 109, at 60.
176. COiio Civii [C.C.] [CIVIL CoDEu] art. 107 (Braz.).
177. Id. art. 109. It reads: "Where a contract is executed with a clause to the effect that
it shall not be valid without a public instrument, this is of the substance of the act."
178. Id. art. 212. It reads: "Juridical acts, for which a special form is not required, may
be proven by means of: I-admission; Il-document; Ill-witness; IV-presumption; V-
examination and inspection;" Apelacao 991020720096, 23a Camara de Direito
Privado do Tribunal de Justica de Sao Paulo, Relator: Jose Marcos Marrone,
20.10.2009.
179. Cooi1o Civil [C.C.] [CiviL CoIini] art. 227 (Braz.). It reads: "Except in express
cases, proof exclusively by witnesses is only admitted in contracts the value of
which does not exceed ten times the highest minimum wage in the country at the
time the contract was concluded". For instance, in 2010, the minimum wage in
Brazil is approximately USD $300.00, according to Medida Provis6ria n. 474, (12/
23/2009).
180. Id. art. 230. It reads: "Presumptions, except the ones determined by law, will not
be admitted in the same situations in which the law excludes witness."
181. Id. art. 221. It reads: "A private instrument, made and signed, or only signed by
one who has the free disposition and administration of his property, proves con-
ventional obligations of any value; but its effects, as well as those of the cession,
are not operative, with respect to third persons, before transcription in the public
register."
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Brazil' 82 These same rules apply to contract modification before or dur-
ing performance.
Despite the fact that there is no formality for contracts for the sale of
goods, arbitration clauses in particular must be in writing, according to
article 4(1) of the Brazilian Arbitration Law'83 and article 6 of the
Mercosur Agreement on International Commercial Arbitration.184
These clauses may be included in the contract itself or contained in a
separate document that refers to the previous agreement.
B. CONTRACT FORMATION UNDER THE CISG
1. Legal Tradition and Sources of Law
As mentioned in the Introduction, the CISG is recognized as the most
relevant treaty governing international contracts for the sale of goods.
One of the reasons why it has achieved such overwhelming success is that
it represents the joint efforts of several countries over more than fifty
years to harmonize international sales laws.' 85 Indeed, from 1928, when
the first study on commercial laws harmonization' 86 began, to 1980, when
the final text of the CISG was unanimously approved, there was a signifi-
cant increase both in numbers and in effective participation by represent-
atives from different legal systems and different socio-economic and
political sectors of the world community.' 87 There were representatives
from the socialist bloc, as well as from developing and developed coun-
tries from both the civil law and the common law traditions. Moreover,
many academics and practitioners as well as international organizations
also contributed to the elaboration of the Convention.'88 This diversity
of points of view and contrasting interests is reflected in the CISG's text,
182. Id. art. 224. It reads: "Documents drawn up in a foreign language shall be trans-
lated into Portuguese, in order to have legal effect in this country."
183. Lei No. 9.307, Lei de Arbitragem [Arbitration Law], art. 4, § 1, 23 Julhio 1996,
Di~irio Oficial da Unilo [D.O.U.] de 23.9.1996 (Braz.). Article 4, § 1 reads: "The
arbitration clause has to be in writing, included in the contract itself or in a sepa-
rate document that refers to the contract."
184. Mercosur Commercial Arbitration Agreement, supra note 37, art. 6. It reads:
"The arbitral convention must be in writing."
185. See generally, WINs1nP, supra note 77.
186. In 1928, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) asked Ernst Rabel to draft a uniform law on international sales of
goods, which would provide the foundation for the CISG.
187. "To be sure, at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference the majority of the sixty-two
participating States belonged to the Western hemisphere, equally divided between
common law and civil law jurisdictions. Yet, there was also an ample representa-
tion of the so-called Eastern or Communist Bloc and an even more numerous
presence of "'non-aligned'" countries of the so-called Third World." Michael Joa-
quim Bonell, The CISG, European Contract Law and the Development of a World
Contract Law, 56 AM. J. Come. L. 1, 2 (2008).
188. All these contributions "proved false the claims sometimes made that the conven-
tion was the product of theoreticians lacking contact with the reality of interna-
tional trading." Peter Schlechtriem, Basic Structures and General Concepts of the
CISG as Models for a Harmonisation of the Law of Obligations, 10 JuluolcA IN-
FERNATIONAL 27-34 (2005).
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which has no dominant domestic law or legal tradition.189
But, due to "considerable differences in the legal traditions and/or in
the socio-economic structures of the States participating in the negotia-
tions, some issues had to be excluded from the scope of the CISG at the
outset."190 The CISG expressly excludes from its coverage several types
of sales, such as consumer sales, and contracts in which the preponderant
part is the supply of services. 191 In addition, some issues, such as contract
validity, 192 property rights, and product liability were also left out of the
Convention.193 Consequently, whenever any of these issues emerge in a
contractual dispute governed by the CISG, the legal solution shall be pro-
vided by the applicable national law, determined according to the PIL
rules of the forum state.194 In fact, the CISG "governs only the formation
of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the
buyer arising from such a contract," as stated by article 4 of the CISG.
Furthermore, in order to encourage worldwide adoption, some conten-
tious provisions were included in the CISG, but were formulated in vague
or ambiguous language or with the reservation that contracting states
could opt out of them. Specifically, in relation to Part II, which regulates
contract formation, article 92(1) of the CISG 95 permits a country to
adopt the rest of the Convention leaving out the rules on contract forma-
tion.196 Among Brazil's major trading partners, none has made such a
declaration.'97 Additionally, according to article 6 of the CISG, parties
may "exclude the application of this Convention or . . . derogate from or
189. For more information on this diversity of points of view, see generally Sara G.
Zwart, The International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between Socialist, Third World,
Common, and Civil Law Principles, 13 N.C. J. INT'i, L. & COM. Ri. 109 (1988).
190. Bonell, supra note 187, at 3.
191. See CISG, supra note 11, arts. 2-3.
192. Article 4(a) of the CISG provides that the convention does not govern the validity
of the contract. The term "validity" is not defined in the text of the Convention.
"Presumably it includes any defence that may vitiate the contract under the proper
law or laws of the contract because, for example, of lack of capacity, misrepresen-
tation, duress, mistake, unconscionability, and contracts contrary to public policy."
Jacob S. Ziegel, Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1981), available at http://www.
cisg.Iaw.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/articles/english2.html. But, in some jurisdictions,
validity rules may intersect with contract formation rules, such as, for example,
formal requirements (See CISG, supra note 11, arts. 11, 29). When there is a con-
flict between the CISG rules and the rules on validity of contracts in a national
system, the CISG prevails, unless that State had made a reservation in this sense.
(Peter Schlechtriem, Vienna Sales Convention 1980 (recent developments)-Devel-
oped Countries' Perspectives, presentation at Conference for International Busi-
ness Law (Singapore 1992) at 27).
193. See CISG supra note 11, arts. 4-5.
194. DIMAIro, supra note 55, at 234.
195. CISG, supra note 11, art. 92(1). It reads: "A contracting state may declare ... that
it will not be bound by Part 11 of this Convention .... "
196. Allan Farnsworth, Formation of Contract in MATCIHEw BENDER, INTERNATIONAL
SAuis: THE7 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS IOR THE' INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES OF Gooos, 2-4 (Nina M. Galston and Hans Smit eds. 1984).
197. Up until December 2010, only Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have made
this reservation.
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vary the effect of any of its provisions," including Part 11.198
With respect to the CISG application by judicial and arbitral tribunals,
article 7(1) of the CISG requires courts to interpret the CISG in regard to
its international character and to the need of promoting uniformity in its
application.199 Despite the fact that there is no common supreme court
to apply or interpret the Convention and, consequentially, there is no
binding precedent, "courts should (not must) follow well-reasoned for-
eign case law opinions; they are free to disregard foreign cases that
demonstrate poor reasoning and those that fail to comply with CISG in-
terpretative methodology." 2 0 0 Nonetheless, there is always a risk that
courts will interpret the CISG differently, in particular with a tendency to
follow their respective domestic legal traditions, also known as homeward
trend.201
As a means to achieve consistent interpretation, the UNCITRAL Sec-
retariat published its Commentary on the 1978 Draft of the CISG.2 0 2 De-
spite the fact that it concerns the 1978 Draft, its provisions are very
similar to the 1980 text. The commentary is considered the closest coun-
terpart to an official commentary and the most authoritative source one
can cite. In addition, foreign legal materials, such as judicial and arbitral
courts' decisions and scholarly writings regarding the applicability of the
CISG, are easily accessible in English through UNCITRAL and other
extensive international databases. 203 Last, but not least, the CISG Advi-
sory Council, a private initiative of scholars from various legal systems
that aims at promoting a uniform interpretation of the CISG, issues opin-
ions and provides guidelines in areas of likely diverging approaches.204
Since its adoption, the CISG has been considered "a landmark in the
international unification process," 205 and has influenced many legislative
reforms on international, regional, and domestic levels. 2 0 6 For instance,
the CISG served as a model for the UNIDROIT Principles of Interna-
198. See CISG supra note 11, arts. 4-5.
199. JoHN MURRAY & HARRy Fui-icirrNER, SALEs, LEASES AN) Euc'rIONIc COM-
MERCE: PRoBLEMS AND MATElIAI.S ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRANS-
ACTIONS 10 (Thomson West 2003).
200. LARRY DIMArIrO IT AL., INTERNATtONAL SAiES LAw: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
or CISG JURISPRUDENciE 4 (Cambridge University Press 2005). Note that foreign
decisions do not have a binding effect upon national courts, but they can be used
as persuasive authority.
201. Id. at 2-3. "Homeward trend reflects the fear that national courts will ignore the
mandate of autonomous-international interpretations of the CISG in favor of in-
terpretations permeated with domestic gloss."
202. See Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, supra note 65.
203. See Clout, www.uncitral.org; Unilex, www.unilex.info; and Pace Database on the
CISG and International Commercial Law, www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
204. See CISG Aovisoizy CouNcIL, www.cisgac.com (last visited June 26, 2011).
205. Bonell, supra note 187, at 1.
206. PvirR SciHUEtfcifrtRIEN, 25 YEARS OF1 Ti CISG: AN INIERNATIONAL LINGUA
FRANCA FOR DRAFIlNG UNIFORM LAws, LEGAL PRINCWI.ES, DoMisTic LiGISLA-
TION ANID TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACeS 167, 174, 177 (Harry M. Flechtner et al.
eds., 2008).
2011] 521
522 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
tional Commercial Contracts (PICC), the Principles of European Con-
tract Law (PECL), the Uniform Act Relating to General Commercial
Law of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Af-
rica (OHADA), and the domestic sales of goods acts from Finland, Nor-
way, Sweden, and China.2 0 7
2. Proposal
The CISG differentiates a proposal from an offer. According to article
14(1), first part, of the CISG, "a proposal for concluding a contract ad-
dressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it is suffi-
ciently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in
case of acceptance." 2 0 8 In other words, under the CISG, an offer is a
binding proposal. A proposal can be evidenced by either a statement
(express) or a conduct (tacit), 20 9 which is the approach in the Brazilian
law. But, in contrast to the position of the Brazilian law, proposals di-
rected to the general public are not considered offers, but merely invita-
tions to make offers, unless otherwise indicated by the offeror. 2 1 0 In
addition, the CISG makes no distinction between offers made to present
persons and offers made to absent persons, while the Brazilian Civil Code
does.
The CISG approach to the parties' intention to be bound is more suita-
ble for international transactions than the Brazilian law approach because
the former respects difficulties in communication between foreign par-
ties.2 1 1 According to article 8(1) of the CISG, a party's real intent will
only be considered "where the other party knew or could not have been
unaware what that intent was." 212 If that is not the case, article 8(2) pro-
vides that such intent shall be defined according to what "a reasonable
person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same
circumstances." 2 1 3 In determining that standard, courts have to give due
consideration to all relevant circumstances of the case, including the ne-
gotiations, practices established by the parties, and usages.
Several foreign scholars understand the term "sufficiently define" to be
problematic. 214 A few national courts consider that a definite proposal
207. For more on the CISG's direct and indirect influence as a role model, see
SARCEVIC, supra note 17, at 10-15; Schwenzer, supra note 53, at 461-63; Bonell,
supra note 187, at 5-26; SCILI:CITRIIN, supra note 206, at 27-34.
208. CISG, supra note 11, art. 14(1).
209. Id. art. 11. It states: "A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by
writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved
by any means, including witnesses."
210. Id. art. 14(2). It reads: "A proposal other than one addressed to one or more
specific persons is to be considered merely as an invitation to make offers, unless
the contrary is clearly indicated by the person making the proposal."
211. BauNo ZEiii i, DiTERMININGJ THE CONTRACrUAL INTENT OF PARTIES UNDER
THE CISG AND COMMON LAW-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN 4 EuRomIAN Jouu-
NAL 01' LAw REFORM 629-43 (Kluwer 2002).
212. CISG, supra note 11, art. 8(1).
213. Id. art. 8(2).
214. Dimatteo, supra note 55, at 54-59; Farnsworth, supra note 194, at 8-10.
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must be clear about identification of the goods, quantity and price,2 15
while the majority of courts are content to have quantity and price being
merely implied.2 16 In fact, several CISG provisions admit that the offer
may contain implicit terms.2 17 First, the second part of article 14(1) of the
CISG, deals with implied terms in the offer itself, stipulating that "a pro-
posal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or im-
plicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the
price." 2 1 8 Secondly, if the offeror has neither expressly nor implicitly
fixed or made provision in the proposal for determining the price, article
55 of the CISG 219 allows "the price generally charged" to serve as a gap
filler.220 Thirdly, usages and practices which the parties have established
between themselves are binding pursuant to article 9(1) of the CISG;2 2 1
thus, they can also be employed to determine the parties' intent regarding
unstated price and quantity.2 2 2 Lastly, the article 8(2) "reasonable per-
215. Helen Kaminksi Pty. Ltd. v. Marketing Australian Prods., 1997 US Dist. LEXIS
10630 at 2-3; Viva Vino Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., No. 99-6368, 2000 US
Dist. LEXIS 12347.
216. Fauba v. Fujitsu Microelectronik, Cour de Cassation, Paris, 92-16.993 (Apr. 22,
1992); Apellate Court Frankfurt (Special Screws Case) 10 U 80/93 (Mar. 4, 1994)
(Ger.).
217. Dimatteo, supra note 55, at 54-59.
218. This provision was included in the CISG as a compromise between countries that
supported open price offers and those that opposed such offers. The opposing
countries viewed unilateral price determination as a disadvantage to the weaker
party. Socialist countries objected because a policy of open price offers did not
satisfy state planning agency requirements. See Zwart, supra note 192, at 117-18;
see also Ziegel, supra note 192.
219. CISG, supra note 11, art. 55. It reads: "Where a contract has been validly con-
cluded but does not expressly or implicitly fix or make provision for determining
the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of any indication to the con-
trary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally charged at the time
of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable circum-
stances in the trade concerned."
220. Article 55 CISG raises another troublesome issue: whether the failure of the parties
to state a price prevents contract formation. Professor Farnsworth has the restrictive
view that an offer is only valid if it contains some method of determining the price.
Considering that article 14(1) of the CISG prevents a contract with an unstated
price from being validly concluded, and that article 55 of the CISG is only applica-
ble when a contract has already been validly concluded, he asserts that article 55
cannot fill in the gaps in article 14(1). Therefore, article 55 would only be applica-
ble after the contract is deemed to be enforceable. See Farnsworth, supra note 194,
at 3-8. In contrast, Professor Honnold understands that article 55 of the CISG
remedies the lack of price or of a methodology for determining the price. In his
opinion, article 6 and article 12 allow the parties to vary the effect of any of the
convention's provisions, including article 14(1) of the CISG, detailing price provi-
sion. JoHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw FOR INTERNATIONAL SAuJES §137.6-154
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International 3d 1999). Honnold's view is supported by
the Secretariat's Commentary to article 14, which states that as long as there is
intent to be bound, the law of sales can supply missing terms.
221. CISG, supra note 11, art. 9(1). It reads: "The parties are bound by any usage to
which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established between
themselves."
222. Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc. et al., 201 F.Supp. 2d 236, 281
(2002); Adamfi Video Production GmbH v. Alkotok Studiosa Kisszovetkezet, Bu-
DAPEST F1OVARos BIROSAGA FB, Budapest, AZ 12.G.41.471/1991 (03/24/1992)
(Hung.).
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son" test, explained above, may also be used to determine the parties'
intent with respect to the missing terms.223 As a result, even though a
proposal does not establish the quantity or the price of the goods these
terms can be inferred and the offer can be considered definite under the
CISG. Contrariwise, under Brazilian law, quantity and price cannot be
implied.
Subsequent to determining whether a proposal is binding under the
CISG, it is necessary to ascertain when it becomes effective. Article
15(1) of the CISG states that it is at the moment "when it reaches the
offeree," which means that a statement was communicated orally or de-
livered personally to the addressee's place of business, mailing address or
habitual residence. 224 Consequently, an offer, whether revocable or ir-
revocable, may be withdrawn by the offeror "if the withdrawal reaches
the offeree before or at the same time as the offer," as stated in article
15(2) of the CISG.2 2 5 An offeree cannot accept an offer until she has
received it, even if she was aware of its existence. 226 This solution is
slightly different from the one adopted by Brazilian law, which considers
an offer binding when it is communicated to the offeree, as explained
above.
Regarding revocability and irrevocability of offers, Brazilian law and
the CISG deal with the issue in a similar way, but the CISG is clearer.
According to article 16(1) of the CISG,2 2 7 an effective offer is revocable
by the offeror until the offeree dispatches her acceptance, and, pursuant
to article 16(2) of the CISG,228 an offer is irrevocable if: (i) it indicates
this limiting condition (for example, firm offers) 229 or (ii) if the offeree
relied on the fact that the offer would be held open, despite the fact that
there was no stated time limit.
Finally, similarly to the Brazilian law position, article 18(2) of the
CISG 230 provides that: (i) in general, an oral offer is terminated immedi-
223. District Court Oldenburg (LG) (Egg Case), 12 0 2943/94 (02/28/1996) (Ger.);
Pratt & Whitney v. Malev BUDAPEST F7OVAROS BIROSAGA Metropolitan Court
(01/10/1992) (Hung.).
224. CISG, supra note 11, art. 24. It reads: "For the purpose of this Part of the Con-
vention, an offer, declaration of acceptance or any other indication of intention
"reaches" the addressee when it is made orally to him or delivered by any other
means to him personally, to his place of business or mailing address or, if he does
not have a place of business or mailing address, to his habitual residence."
225. Id. art. 15(2).
226. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, supra note 65, 22-23, art. 13, cmt. 1.
227. CISG, supra note 11, art. 16(1). It reads: "Until a contract is concluded an offer
may be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an
acceptance."
228. Id. art. 16(2). It reads: "However, an offer cannot be revoked: (a) if it indicates,
whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable;
or (b) if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable
and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer."
229. See id. art. 20.
230. Id. art. 18(2). It reads: "An acceptance is not effective if the indication of assent
does not reach the offeror within the time he has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within
a reasonable time, due account being taken of the circumstances of the transaction,
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ately after it is made; (ii) an indefinite offer is terminated within a reason-
able time, taking into account the circumstances of the transaction; and
(iii) a firm offer is terminated within the time fixed by the offeror. But,
the CISG filled the Brazilian Civil Code's lacuna with respect to termina-
tion of an offer by rejection, establishing, in its article 17 that "an offer,
even if it is irrevocable, is terminated when a rejection reaches the of-
feror." 2 3 1 Consequently, if the offeree rejects the offer, she cannot assent
to it later, unless the offeror agrees to it, as will be explained in the next
section.
3. Acceptance
As provided by article 18(1) of the CISG, an acceptance is "a statement
made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer." 2 3 2
Therefore, an acceptance can be either express or implied. Nonetheless,
in accordance with the second part of that article, "[s]ilence or inactivity
does not in itself amount to acceptance," 233 and as a result, an offeree
may disregard an offer, even if that offer stipulates that acceptance is
presumed if no answer to the contrary is received. 234 Regarding the sec-
ond part of this rule, some scholars23 5 argue that the term "in itself" al-
lows silence to be considered acceptance in some cases, particularly if
silence is linked with other circumstances such as failure to act in the
opposite direction, practices established by the parties, and industry us-
ages. This interpretation, which is quite similar to the approach of Brazil-
ian law, is supported by several national courts' decisions. 2 36
Under the CISG's regime, the offeree's response does not need to
match integrally with the offer to constitute an acceptance, unlike the
Brazilian law. As will be better explained in section III.B.4, a reply with
additional or different terms that do not materially alter the offer is con-
sidered an acceptance, unless the offeror, as soon as possible, objects to
the discrepancy.
According to article 18(2), first part, of the CISG, an acceptance only
"becomes effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the
including the rapidity of the means of communication employed by the offeror.
An oral offer must be accepted immediately unless the circumstances indicate
otherwise."
231. Id. art. 17.
232. Id. art. 18(1).
233. Id.
234. DiMatteo, supra note 55, at 52.
235. See DiMatteo, supra note 55, at 60-66; see also Honnold, supra note 220, at §§ 164-
79.
236. (Rare Hard Wood Case) Oberlandesgericht K61n [OLG] [Appellate Court of
Koin] Feb. 22, 1994, 22 Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen
[OLGZ] (Ger.); Hughes v. Societe Technocontact, Cour de Cassation [CC] [Su-
preme Court], Jan. 27, 1998, Bull. civ. 1998, 95-19.448, 180 P (Fr.); Calzados
Magnanni v. Shoes General International, Cour d'Appel de Grenoble [CA] [Court
of Appeals of Grenoble], Oct. 21, 1999, 961/00101 (Fr.); (Terry Cloth Case) Ober-
landesgericht Dresden [OLG] [Appellate Court of Dresden] July 9, 1998, 7 Recht-
sprechung der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen 720/98 (Ger.).
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offeror." 237 This rule has two ramifications. First, if an acceptance is lost
in the mail and never reaches the offeror, it is not effective even though
the offeror was aware of the acceptance by other means.238 Second, an
acceptance in transit may be withdrawn by the offeree if the withdrawal
reaches the offeror before or concomitantly with the acceptance.239 But,
after an acceptance becomes effective, it cannot be revoked in any event.
The first part of article 18(2) of the CISG contrasts with the position sup-
ported by the majority of Brazilian scholars, which is that, as explained in
section III.A.5, an acceptance becomes effective when it is dispatched by
the offeree.
Importantly, only a timely acceptance can be effective. article 18(2) of
the CISG provides that: (i) in general, an oral offer must be accepted
immediately; (ii) an indefinite offer must be accepted within a reasonable
time; and (iii) a firm offer must be accepted within the time fixed by the
offeror. 240 Therefore, late acceptances (statements of assent that reach
the offeror when the proposal has already been terminated) are not effec-
tive, unless the offeror, without delay, so informs the offeree.241 Never-
theless, if the acceptance is sent in due time but does not reach the
offeror on time for reasons that are not under the offeree's control, the
acceptance is effective, unless the offeror, without delay, responds to the
offeree to the contrary. 242 These rules coincide with the Brazilian law
provisions.
4. Counter-Offer
As under Brazilian law, under the CISG a late acceptance or a reply
that purports to be an acceptance, but suggests the possibility of addi-
tional or different terms is considered a counter-offer, terminating the
first offer and continuing the negotiation.243 Nonetheless, "in order to
avoid absurd situations when a smallest divergence would amount to a
new offer," 24 if these additional or different terms are not material, the
237. CISG, supra note 11, art. 18(2).
238. Farnsworth, supra note 196, at 14.
239. CISG, supra note 11, art. 22. It reads: "An acceptance may be withdrawn if the
withdrawal reaches the offeror before or at the same time as the acceptance would
have become effective."
240. Id. art. 18(2).
241. Id. art. 21(1). It reads: "A late acceptance is nevertheless effective as an accept-
ance if without delay the offeror orally so informs the offeree or dispatches a no-
tice to that effect."
242. Id. art. 21(2). It reads: "If a letter or other writing containing a late acceptance
shows that it has been sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been
normal it would have reached the offeror in due time, the late acceptance is effec-
tive as an acceptance unless, without delay, the offeror orally informs the offeree
that he considers his offer as having lapsed or dispatches a notice to that effect."
243. Id. art. 19(1). It reads: "A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance
but contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer
and constitutes a counter-offer."
244. See Andrea Feijos, Battle of Forms Under the Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (CISG): A Uniform Solution?,11 VINooBONA J. OF
INT'L COMMERCIAL LAw & ARBITRATION, 113, 113-29 (2007).
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reply is seen as an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay,
notifies the offeree to the contrary.245 As a result, the "Last Shot Rule"
applies and the minor additions and modifications contained in the ac-
ceptance become part of the contract.
Taking into account that article 19(3) of the CISG provides a non-ex-
haustive list of material terms, including "among other things . . . the
price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of deliv-
ery, extent of one party's liability to the other [and] the settlement of
disputes," 246 the prevailing scholarly opinion is that the CISG in fact
adopts the old common law "Mirror Image Rule" as the Brazilian law
does, but with an exception regarding minor differences between the of-
fer and the acceptance. 247
With respect to material discrepancies, in the event that the original
offeror objects to them prior to performance, there is no binding contract
because a deviating acceptance is considered a counter-offer and requires
the offeror's approval to form the contractual relationship. But, if she
does not object to these terms and starts performance (for example, by
delivering the goods or paying the price), national judges and arbitrators
tend to find a valid contract between the parties because performance
indicates assent.
In this event, courts would have to determine the terms of the contract.
But, previous judicial and arbitral decisions show that questions like these
are not easy to resolve. While some courts have found that the contrac-
tual terms are the ones contained in the last form exchanged by the par-
ties, applying the same "Last Shot Rule" approach adopted by Brazilian
courts,2 4 8 others have applied the less arbitrary and more logical "Knock
Out Rule" excluding the conflicting terms provided by the parties and
replacing them by the provisions of the CISG or of the applicable law.2 4 9
245. CISG, supra note 11, art. 19(2). It reads: "However, a reply to an offer which
purports to be an acceptance but contain additional or different terms which do
not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the
offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a no-
tice to that effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms
of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance."
246. Id. art. 19(3).
247. DiMatteo, supra note 55, at 244; Josiei LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG
58-9 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International) (2d ed. 2008); Honnold, supra note
220, at 193.
248. Oberlandesgericht Saarbrucken [OLG] [Appellate Court of Saarbrucken] Jan. 13,
1992, 1 Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen U 69/92 [OLGZ]
(Ger.); Oberlandesgericht Minchen [OLG] [Appellate Court of Munich] Mar. 11,
1998, 7 Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen U 4427/97 [OLGZ]
(Ger.); Filanto SpA v. Chilewich Int'l Corp. 789 F.Supp. 1229, 1240 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); ICC Arbitration Case no. 8611 (01/23/1997); Maggellan Int'l Corp. V.
Salzgitter Handel GmbH No. 99 C 5153, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19386 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 7, 1999); Oberlandesgericht K61n [OLG] [Appellate Court of Koln] May 24,
2006, 16 Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen [OLGZJ U 25/06
(Ger.).
249. BuNonsaERIUis1ice [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan. 9, 2002, VIII ZR
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 304/00 (Ger.);
Societe Les Verreries de Saint Gobain, SA v. Martinswerk GmbH, Cour de Cassa-
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A few other courts arrived at an alternative solution, called the "First
Shot Rule," of ignoring the offeree's counter-offer terms and upholding
the offeror's proposal terms.2 5 0 "Whichever approach a given court pre-
fers, article 19 should not be read in isolation from other Convention
provisions." 2 5 1
5. Moment of Contract Formation
Article 23 of the CISG states that "a contract is concluded at the mo-
ment when an acceptance of an offer becomes effective," which is "the
moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror," pursuant to article
18(2) of the CISG.2 5 2 Therefore, in contrast to the Brazilian law, which,
according to the majority of Brazilian scholars, adopts the Dispatch The-
ory, the CISG adopts the Receipt Theory,2 5 3 explained in section II.A.5.
6. Place of Contract Formation
Even though, under PIL rules in many jurisdictions, the place of con-
tracting is important for determining the applicable law, the CISG has no
provision regarding this issue, probably because its applicability depends
on the parties' place of business rather than on the place where the con-
tract is formed. The Secretariat Commentary on article 23 of the CISG 2 5 4
elucidates that even though this provision concerns the moment at which
a contract is concluded, it may be interpreted in some legal systems to be
tion [CC] [Supreme Court], July 16, 1998, Bull. civ. 1998, J 96-11.984 (Fr.);
Nordgemuse Wilhelm Krogmann, OGH v. Javier Vierto, STS, Feb. 17. 1998 (J.T.S.,
3516) (Spain).
250. ICT/Princen Automatisiering Oss, Gerechtshof [Hof] [Appellate Court],
Hertogenbosch, Nov. 16, 1996 (Neth.); ISEA Industrie v. Lu, Cours d'appel [CA
Paris] [Court of Appeals of Paris], Dec. 13, 1995 (Fr.).
251. Lookofsky, supra note 247, at 59.
252. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, supra note 65, at 25-26, art. 21, cmt. 1. It reads: "Article 21 specifically
states that which would otherwise have undoubtedly been understood to be the
rule, i.e. that the contract is concluded at the moment than an acceptance of an
offer is effective [becomes effective] in accordance with the provisions of this Con-
vention. It was thought desirable to state this rule explicitly because of the large
number of rules in this Convention which depend on the time of the conclusion of
the contract." Articles 55 and 68 of the CISG are provisions that depend on this
determination.
253. Guide to Article 23-Comparison with Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/peclcomp23.html (last visited June
26, 2011).
254. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, supra note 65, at 26, art. 21, cmt. 2. The second part of the Secretariat
Commentary reads: "Article 21 does not state an express rule for the place at
which the contract is concluded. Such a provision is unnecessary since no provi-
sion of this Convention depends upon the place at which the contract is concluded.
Furthermore, the consequences in regard to conflicts of law and judicial jurisdic-
tion which might arise from fixing the place at which the contract is concluded are
uncertain and might be unfortunate. However, the fact that article 21 [draft coun-
terpart of article 23], in conjunction with article 16 [draft counterpart of CISG
article 18], fixes the moment at which the contract is concluded may be interpreted
in some legal systems to be determinative of the place at which it is concluded."
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determinative of the place of contract formation. Thus, the national law
designated by the forum's PIL rules must resolve this issue. 2 5 5
7. Formal Requirements
According to article 11 of the CISG, "a contract of sale need not be
concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other re-
quirement as to form . . . " unless the parties establish their own formali-
ties, derogating from or varying the effect of the CISG's provisions,
pursuant to article 6 of the CISG and the principle of party autonomy. 256
This means that absent additional requirements established by the par-
ties, contracts governed by the CISG may be proven by any means, in-
cluding written agreements, informal correspondence (such as an
unsigned fax or an invoice in conjunction with a bill of landing), negotia-
tions, prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, oral testimony, prior
course of dealing, the parties' intent, and the parties' conduct. 2 5 7 There-
fore, with respect to evidence of contract formation, the CISG is as infor-
mal as the Brazilian law, both in form and substance.
Likewise, the CISG does not require any particular form for modifica-
tion of pre-existing commercial contracts before or during the course of
performance. As stated by article 29 of the CISG,2 5 8 the mere agreement
of the parties is enough, unless they have determined in an earlier written
contract a specific formality, such as a "no oral modification" clause.
But, the conduct of a party may preclude her from demanding compli-
ance with the formal requirement if the other party has relied on such
conduct. For example, when the parties have made an oral adjustment to
the original contract regarding a payment due date, one party cannot in-
sist on the earlier payment schedule, because the other party probably
has relied on the oral modification to manage her business' cash flow. 2 5 9
255. Guide to Article 23-Comparison with Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL), supra note 224; Editorial remarks (comparative commentary) on Article
23 CISG and its PECL counterparts (2002).
256. CISG, supra note 11, arts. 8-9, 11.
257. DIMAITTEO, supra note 200 at 38-41; Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc.,
201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v.
Ceramica Nuova d'Agnostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1389 n.14 (11th Cir. 1998);
Calzaturificio v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4856 at *18
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1998); Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court] Dec. 5, 1995,
45 HG 1994 (Switz.); Morales v. Nez Mktg., Mexican Commission for the Protec-
tion of Foreign Trade [Compromex], May 4, 1993, M/66/92 (Mex.).
258. CISG, supra note 11, art. 29 reads: "(1) A contract may be modified or terminated
by the mere agreement of the parties. (2) A contract in writing which contains a
provision requiring any modification or termination by agreement to be in writing
may not be otherwise modified or terminated by agreement. However, a party
may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that
the other party has relied on that conduct."
259. Samuel Date-Bah, Article 29, in BIANCA-BONEu., COMMENTARY ON IIm INTER-
NATIONAL SAuEs LAw, 240-244 (Guiffr6, ed., 1987); see also JOHN 0. HONNOL,
UNwFoRM LAw FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNIm NATIONS
CONVENTION, 229-235 (1999); Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [OLG] [Appellate
Court of Hamburg] Sept. 26, 1990, 5 Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte in
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Because the other parties' reliance is a condition for this exception to
apply, the Secretariat Commentary on article 29 of the CISG 260 suggests
that where a contract has been partially performed and the parties have
agreed to an oral modification, a party who intends to resume her original
rights for the remainder of the contract must give notice to that effect to
the other party. The Brazilian law does not deal with this issue.
With respect to arbitration and jurisdiction clauses, the CISG does not
provide any particular rule. But, other international conventions, such as
the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards of 1958 (1958 NY Convention), which was ratified by Brazil and
its most important trading partners, such as the European Union, 1968
Brussels Convention, and the Mercosur 1994 Buenos Aires Protocol, do
and may override the CISG, requiring these terms to be in writing.2 6 1
Importantly, contracting states whose legislations demand contracts of
sale of goods to be concluded in a written form, or that prescribe any
other requirement as to form, such as "consideration" in the case of com-
mon law countries, can preserve their formal requirements by making an
article 96 CISG 2 6 2 declaration. Foreign scholars have provided two di-
verging interpretations for this reservation. 263 First, formal requirements
will always be preserved when one of the parties is from a contracting
state that has made such a reservation. Second, these requirements will
only be respected if the forum state's PIL principles point to the law of an
article 96 reservatory contracting state. This means that contracts con-
cluded with parties whose place of business are in article 96 reservatory
states may be subject to written requirements. By the same token, con-
tracts concluded with parties from all other contracting states, even states
whose domestic laws prescribe any restriction or limitation, will follow
the Convention's rules. Among Brazil's major trading partners, only Ar-
gentina has made such declaration.264
Despite the fact that article 6 of the CISG and the principle of party
autonomy allow parties to derogate from or vary the effect of any CISG
provision, and article 9(1) of the CISG provides that parties are bound to
Zivilsachen 0 543 [OLGZI (Ger.); Auto-Moto Styl S.R.O./Pedro Boat B.V., Ger-
echtshof [Hof] [Appellate Court], Leeuwarden, Aug. 31, 2005 (Neth.).
260. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, supra note 65, at 27-28, art. 27, cmt. 8.
261. DiMatteo, supra note 200, at 39.
262. CISG, supra note 11, art. 96 reads: "A Contracting State whose legislation re-
quires contracts of sale to be concluded or evidenced by writing may at any time
make a declaration in accordance with article 12 that any provision of article 11,
article 29, or Part II of this Convention, that allows a contract of sale or its modifi-
cation or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance, or other indication of
intention to be made in any form other than in writing, does not apply where any
party has his place of business in that State."
263. Jerzi Rajski, Article 96, in BIANCA-BONELL, COMMENTARY ON TiE INTERNA-
nONAL SA is LAw 658-660 (Giuffrb, ed., 1987).
264. See CISG: Table of Contracting States, Pace Law School Inst. of Int'l Commercial
Law, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (as of September
2010, Article 96 CISG Reservatory Contracting States list includes also Armenia,
Belarus, Chile, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Paraguay, Russia and Ukraine).
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any usage or practice which they have established between themselves,
parties from article 96 reservatory states may not derogate or vary their
countries' reservation in order to make formal requirements more
flexible. 265
C. CONTRACT FORMATION UNDER THE AMERICAN LAW
1. Legal Tradition and Sources of Law
The common law system originated in England 266 and expanded into
its former colonies, including the United States of America. Although
the more general and essential aspects of the English legal tradition, such
as the style of legal thought and the role played by the jury in the admin-
istration of both civil and criminal justice, were absorbed by the Ameri-
can legal system and have never been displaced, some features were
modified as a means to adapt to the New World while others developed
apart from its roots, especially after the American Revolution. 267 As a
result, U.S. law today is a fully autonomous legal system detached from
the English legal system. Moreover, inasmuch as other countries, such as
the Netherlands, France, and Spain, first colonized some regions of the
United States, the law of some states still bears the imprint of such origin.
For instance, Louisiana is the only American state that has retained the
civil law, as opposed to the common law that is in force in the other
states.
Clearly, the relevance of case law as a source of authority is the distinc-
tive feature of the common law in comparison with the civil law system.
The essence of the common law is that legal rules are made not only by
legislators, which is the case of civil law countries in general, but also by
judges, who apply the law to the facts before them according to the im-
plicit principle of stare decisis, which means "to stand by decided mat-
ters" 268 and is also called the "rule of precedent." According to this
doctrine, cases dealing with the same material facts should be decided in
a similar way, which is fundamental for the system's integrity, coherence,
and predictability. For this reason, in theory, common law legal actors
think inductively on a case-by-case basis, building their legal argument by
265. CISG, supra note 11, art. 12.
266. The Common Law legal system was first advanced by the English kings' judges
between 1100-1272, aiming at the creation of a national legal system and the con-
solidation of royal power through the centralization of the administration of jus-
tice. The law they applied was said to be common because it supposedly
represented the customs of the whole realm. In order not to cause confusion for
civil law readers, the term "common law" will be used in this thesis to refer only to
"the Common Law legal system," and the term "case law" will be used to refer to
"the law developed by courts' decisions" (as opposed to statutes). The distinction
between "common law" and "equity" will not be discussed here.
267. Awriiutz T. VON MEIIREN & PETER L. MURRAY, LAW IN Ti-IE UNITED STATEs 32-
40 (2007); A LLAN E. FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THi, LEGAL SYSTEM OF
THE UNITED STATErs 6-12 (1996).
268. From stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means, "to stand by the decisions
and not disturb settled points." The doctrine of stare decisis and the doctrine of
precedent will be used in this thesis interchangeably.
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delimitating the facts and then searching for legal principles derived from
these facts, rather than starting with an abstract rule and determining
which factual patterns match within it, as their civil law counterparts
do. 269
If there is no previous decision, or the judge finds that the case is essen-
tially distinct from the existing previous decisions, she has the authority
and the duty to create the law, giving a solution for that individual case.
This is called a case of "first impression." But, this lawmaking is limited
to the narrow factual boundaries of the case before her. On the other
hand, if there is an earlier decision of the same court or of a higher court
whose facts are similar to the case at hand, the judge cannot make up a
new law; she must follow the precedent. A decision of a higher court acts
as binding authority on the court that made the ruling and on lower
courts of the same jurisdiction. As a consequence, only appellate courts'
decisions carry authority, and decisions of the court of last resort have
final authority. In addition, rulings of courts from different jurisdictions
and of coordinate courts of the same jurisdiction act only as persuasive
authority. Despite the fact that courts do not need to follow these deci-
sions, they have to give them high consideration.
Nevertheless, because the rule is that case law must be faithful to the
principle behind each decision and not to the decision itself, judges and
lawyers can avoid the operation of the stare decisis doctrine by utilizing
several devices. One such device is the process of "distinguishing," where
the material facts of the precedential case are compared with the material
facts of the case at bar. If they differ, the previous decision is not bind-
ing.2 7 0 Another device is to characterize the ratio decidendi, which is the
part of the case that contains the rule of law on which the judicial deci-
sion is based, as mere obiter dictum, an incidental expression of opinion
that is not essential to the decision.271 Furthermore, in cases where the
precedent was reached by concurrent opinions, the judge can decide
among those opinions which one she wishes to follow and can ignore the
269. BOcDAN, supra note 89, at 84; VON MEIJREN & MURRAY, supra note 267, at 40.
270. VON MEHIREN & MURRAY, supra note 267, at 44 ("The ability to recognize poten-
tial fact distinctions that might dilute or eliminate the precedential force of a prior
decision and articulate them in argument or in judicial opinions is an important
skill of a common law lawyer or judge.").
271. FARNswownsii, supra note 267, at 54 ("[J]udges, unlike legislators, have no power
to lay down rules for cases that are not before them . . . what they say on such
other matters is not binding."); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821);
see also Graham Hughes, Common Law Systems, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERI-
CAN LAw-NE-w YORK UNIVERSITY SciooL OF LAw 19 (Allan B. Morrison ed.,
1996) (noting that to determine with precision the holding (ratio decidendi) of a
precedent decision is a difficult task, "First, even when the result is joined in by all
the judges, different strands of reasoning may appear in the opinions of different
judges, who are free to explain the decision in their own way and often do. Sec-
ond, propositions of law are obviously always connected with the facts to which
they are declared to be applicable .... But what facts are essential or most impor-
tant is neither preordained nor obvious. To some extent the opinion of the court
may reveal what facts it considered to be essential, but the opinion will often leave
room for disagreements.").
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others. Lastly, the judge can simply overrule the precedential decision,
understanding that it was wrongly decided or that some relevant condi-
tions or policies have changed. 272
Despite the importance of case law, legislative enactments have en-
joyed primacy as a source of law in the common law system, especially
after the nineteenth century. Indeed, the increasing complexity of eco-
nomic and social life intensified the need for government regulation, both
at state and federal levels, because "modern regulation would be impossi-
ble to effect and implement with the old, pure [case] law method of
slowly building rules and principles through authoritative judicial deci-
sions in individual cases." 273
Nevertheless, American statutes differ from civil law codes in that they
are not generalized, systematic statements of established legal rules and
principles. In general, they are construed strictly and narrowly, and
sometimes arranged in "codes," which are no more than groupings of leg-
islation about the same issue. A similarity between civil law codes and
common law statutes is that enacted law has supremacy over case law. A
legislature has the power to abolish or modify case law, but judicial deci-
sions cannot change statutory law. But, when courts interpret statutory
provisions, their rulings have precedential effect. 2 7 4
The supreme law in the United States is the American Constitution,
enacted on September 25, 1789.275 In contrast to Brazil's federal system,
the American federation originated from the voluntary alliance of thir-
teen sovereign former British colonies;276 therefore, in order to reach a
compromise between the states, the centralized government was granted
limited authority, and the residual powers were reserved to the states. 277
272. Because precedents can be changed, it would be reasonable to conclude that
judges from the Common Law tradition are free to make new rules. But, their
rulings will only become a legal principle if both the decision is not reversed on
appeal and other judges support this change in the law applying the new prece-
dent. Surely, the level of support will depend on the rationale given for the
change. When judges decide a case they are not only worried about the impact of
the ruling on the particular parties, but also on what precedent they want to make,
in which direction they want the law to evolve.
273. Hughes, supra note 271, at 14.
274. WIuLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCrION 0ro rE LAW AND LIEGAL SYSnFM OF niuE
UNITED STA-ni s 35-38 (1999); VoN MEHREN, supra note 267 at 14-19.
275. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, § 2 reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the land; and the Judges in every States shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Federal laws
and international treaties also have supremacy over other laws, however, both of
them are hierarchically inferior to the Constitution.
276. Note that the former colonies became independent from England in 1781 with the
Declaration of Independence. However, they did not organize themselves as a
federation from the beginning. The Articles of Confederation, a document from
1781, established a confederation of independent states.
277. U.S. CONsr. amend. X reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people."
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Although Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution enumerates the fed-
eral government's legislative powers, some provisions are unclear. As a
result, Congress has supported a fair-reaching federal authority availing
itself of "the commerce clause" 2 7 8 and "the necessary and proper
clause," 2 7 9 and most of the U.S, Supreme Court's tasks for the last centu-
ries was to elucidate the constitutional distribution of federal and state
authorities. In summary, the federal legislature has authority to regulate
interstate commerce and state legislatures intrastate commerce within
each state jurisdiction. 2 0
But, interests over interstate and intrastate commerce may sometimes
coincide. Thus, some subjects may be regulated by both federal and state
statutes. In this event, as a matter of American constitutional law, federal
law overrides state law. Examples of federal statutes that preempt state
legislation are the Federal Bill of Landing Act, the Carmack Amendment
to the Interstate Commerce Act, the National Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, and the Magnuson-Moss-Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act. 2 8 1
In addition, bearing in mind that there are fifty American states and
each one has jurisdiction to regulate commerce within its boundaries,
there are fifty different regulations potentially applicable to trade activi-
ties in the United States. But, state divergence in common law and statu-
tory rules has greatly diminished in the recent years. 282 On the subject of
commercial law, the American Law Institute (ALI) 2 8 3 and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL), in a
joint-project for state law harmonization, elaborated the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.), whose official text was released in 1958. By 1968,
article 2 (U.C.C.-Sales), covering contracts of sale of goods, was enacted
as legislation by all American states, 284 except Louisiana. 285
278. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several states"); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
279. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 ("[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"); see also McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
280. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
281. Donald J. Rapson, Commercial Law, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AMiRICAN LAw-NEw
YORK UNIVERSIY Sciioi OF LAw 365-66 (Allan B. Morrison, ed., 1996); JAMs
J. Wnrmi & Rosewr S. SUMMERS, UNw17oRM COMMERCIAL CODE 8 (2000).
282. VON MEHREN & MURRAY, supra note 267, at 39-40.
283. The ALl is a voluntary organization of judges, law professors, and leading practi-
tioners concerned with the improvement and clarification of American law. See
www.ali.org.
284. In spite of the fact that the U.C.C.-Sales was reviewed in 2003, not a single state
has adopted the revised version. Therefore, only the 1958 version of the U.C.C.
will be discussed in this thesis. Furthermore, note that each state's U.C.C. is
slightly different; thus, persons doing business in different states must observe indi-
vidual discrepancies. The same is true for lawyers and legal researchers studying
the U.C.C.
285. In 1974, the state of Louisiana adopted other parts of the U.C.C., but not article 2,
preferring to maintain its own civil law tradition on this issue.
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The U.C.C.-Sales departs from the regular American statutes inasmuch
as it is a very comprehensive code. It covers several aspects of sale of
goods, including contract formation, parties' obligations, warranties,
methods of payment, title, performance, breach, and remedies. As stated
by section 2-102 of the U.C.C., this code applies only to transactions in
goods. "Goods" are defined as "all things ... which are moveable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale." 286 Furthermore, both ex-
isting and identified goods and future goods can be objects of a contract
for sale. 2 8 7 Regarding "mixed" or "hybrid" transactions, for example, a
transaction in which not only goods are sold, but services are rendered,
case law has supplemented the code delimitating the relevant
boundaries. 288
Article 1 is also relevant because it sets forth the general principles
governing the whole code.289 For instance, the U.C.C. expressly em-
braces the principle of party utonomy, the principle of good faith, and the
principle of freedom of contract, limited to the observance of obligations
of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care. 290
Nonetheless, the U.C.C. does not purport to contain all rules applica-
ble to commercial transactions; in fact, the code is supplemented by other
legal rules, 291 such as case law for interpreting and construing the code,
and the common law of contracts. 292 In addition, each section of the
U.C.C. is supplemented by "official comments" that help in the construc-
tion and the application of the code. Although these comments are not
binding because they are not part of the statutory law, lawyers and judges
rely heavily upon them and their adoption in judicial decisions has prece-
dential force. 293
Finally, unlike the Brazilian Civil Code, but like the CISG, "most of the
[U.C.C.'s] provisions are not mandatory. The parties may vary their ef-
fect or displace them altogether: freedom of contract is the rule. Most
286. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2004).
287. U.C.C. H§ 2-105(2), 2-106(1), 2-501(1).
288. The minority view understands that U.C.C.-Sales should be applied only to the
sale of goods aspects of the transaction (Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d
222, 226, 4 UCC 446 (10th Cir. 1967)). Whereas the majority view applies
U.C.C.-Sales only if the "predominant purpose" of the whole transaction was a
sale of goods (Loughridge v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 192 F. Supp.2d 1175,
1182 (D. Colo. 2002); Princess Cruises v. General Electric Company, 143 F.3d 828,
832 (4th Cir. 1998)).
289. As of 2010, the majority of states (thirty-five) have adopted the 2001 revised ver-
sion of article 1, thus, this will be the version studied in this thesis, except for § 1-
301, which was not adopted by any state.
290. U.C.C. W§l-105, 1-304, 1-302 (Rev. 2001).
291. U.C.C. §1-103(b) (Rev. 2001).
292. The sources of the common law of Contracts are case law and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. The Restatement is a comprehensive statement of general
common law contract principles promulgated by the American Law Institute
(AL). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts was published in 1979. While not
enacted law itself, the Restatement is an authority with a high degree of persuasion
and is often cited and quoted by American courts to justify their decisions.
293. Rapson, supra note 281 at 369; MURRAY JR. & FLECIFlNER, supra note 200 at 6.
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commercial law is therefore not in the Code at all but in private agree-
ments, including course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of
performance. "294
2. Sources of Obligations
Prior to analyzing the American law rules on formation of commercial
contracts, it is relevant to this study to explain the sources of obligations
under this legal regime for its peculiarities.
Within traditional common law, only promises supported by "consider-
ation" are legally binding.295 Generally, a performance or a return prom-
ise that has a sufficient, but not necessarily adequate, value will constitute
consideration, as long as it was given in exchange for a promise-in other
words, if it was bargained for.2 9 6 Most commercial agreements would
qualify for enforcement inasmuch as they involve exchanges (for exam-
ple, goods exchanged for money). On the other hand, gratuitous 2 9 7 and
illusory promises298 would be unenforceable. Consideration, as an objec-
tive requirement of manifestation of assent, is unique to the common law
system 299 and is the main basis for enforcing promises in the United
States.
Exceptionally, a promise not supported by consideration may be en-
forceable as a contract if: (i) it was foreseeable to the promisor that the
promisee would rely on the promise; (ii) the promisee actually relied on
the promise changing her position; and (iii) injustice could only be
avoided by enforcing the promise.300 This doctrine is called promissory
estoppel, and it was to some extent embraced by both the Brazilian law
and the CISG. As already demonstrated, a revocable offer becomes ir-
revocable under these two regimes if the offeree has relied on the fact
that it would be kept open, and a late acceptance is considered effective if
it was sent by the offeree in due time, but due to circumstances beyond
294. WITE & SUMMERS, supra note 282 at 8.
295. Note that, originally in English law, written promises made "under seal" do not
require consideration. For more information, see RiESTATEnMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRAcIS §§ 95-109 (1981). But, today in America, the presence of a seal has no
effect (e.g., U.C.C. § 2-203) or, at most, it may give rise to a rebuttable presump-
tion that the requirement of consideration has been met §§ 95-109, Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.
296. RiESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS H 17(1), 71-79 (1981)); Hammer v. Sid-
way, 124 N.Y. 538, 545, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891); Lake Land Emp't Grp. of
Akron, LLC v. Columber, 101 Ohio St. 3d 242, 804 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ohio 2004).
297. In Civil Law countries, a gift can be enforced if it follows certain formalities. In
American law, formalities are unimportant.
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 77 (1979); Mattei v. Hoper, 51 Cal.2d
119,330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, N.E.
214 (N.Y. 1917).
299. Arthur T. Von Mehren, Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in
Comparative Analysis 72 HARV. L. Ri.v. 1009, 1057-1062 (1959).
300. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) o CONTRAcrs § 90 (1979); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57
Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1959); D&G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imports, Inc., 923 F.2d 566 (7th Cir.
1991).
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her control, reached the offeror after the time limit, and the offeror did
not so inform the offeree.
Moreover, in order to prevent unjust enrichment, restitution, under
American law, is an alternative basis for recovery even when there has
been no promise.301 The underlying premise is that benefits received
through another's loss are unjust and should be restored. But restitution
is not available if the benefit was conferred officiously. Despite the fact
that the Brazilian law also regulates unjust enrichment and restitution, 302
the CISG deals with the issue as part of the parties' rights and obliga-
tions.303 Considering that this thesis aims only to compare contract for-
mation and not the parties' rights and obligations, restitution as a source
of obligation will not be discussed further.
3. Proposal
In American law, an offer is a simple communication made by the of-
feror manifesting her intent to enter into an agreement for the exchange
of performances which confers upon the offeree the power to create a
contractual relationship between them, often called the "power of accept-
ance." This manifestation must show enough certainty that the offeree
can properly understand that acceptance is all that is necessary to con-
clude the bargain.304 It may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement;305 thus, it can be either express (written or oral) or tacit (by
an act or failure to act), 30 6 as in the Brazilian law and the CISG approach.
Accordingly, all acts that do not lead the offeree to believe that she is
empowered to close the deal, such as offers that are insufficiently serious
and fail to indicate the promisor's intent to be bound (i.e., jests or opti-
mistic statements of opinion), 307 clear manifestations of intention not to
be bound (i.e., words inviting further discussion or soliciting an offer),308
or offers made to the general public (i.e., advertisements and mass mail-
301. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907); Callano v. Oakwood
Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J.Super. 105, 219 A.2d 332 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.,
1966).
302. See CODIGO CivIL [C.C.] [Civii. CODE] arts. 884-86 (Braz.).
303. See CISG, supra note 11, art. 81.
304. RESTATEMENe (SEcoNo) OF CoNrRAcrs §24 (1979); Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and
Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations 26 YAiF L.J. 169, 181-182
(1917); H. GREENBERG, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER UCC Awrici u 2 50
(1987); Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YAiuF L. 169, 181-182 (1917).
305. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) reads: "A contract for sale of goods may be made in any man-
ner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recog-
nizes the existence of such a contract."
306. RESTATEMFNr (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs §§ 4, 19(1) (1979); Consarc Corp. v.
Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 570 (2d. Cir. 1993); Winston v.
Mediafare Entertainment Corp., 777 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1985).
307. Leonard v. Pepsico, 88 F.Supp.2d 116, 129 (S.D.N.Y.1999).
308. RUsArTmENr (SECOND) OF CONTRACeS § 21 (1979); Rose & Frank Co. v. J.R.
Crompton & Bros., Ltd., (1923) 2 K.B. 261 (U.K.).
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ing), 309 may prevent contract formation. The first two examples of non-
obligatory proposals mirror the positions adopted by both the Brazilian
law and the CISG, as explained above. With regard to the last example,
on the other hand, article 429 of the Brazilian Civil Code, unlike the
American law and the CISG approaches, which consider that proposals
addressed to unspecific persons are not binding, provides that these kinds
of proposals are seen as offers provided they contain all the essential re-
quirements. Thus, under the Brazilian legal regime, they may bind the
offeror.
Situations in which the offeror's subjective intent differs from the ob-
jective meaning of the words expressed by her may be problematic. As
already seen, Brazilian law attaches great importance to the real intent of
the party making a declaration of will. In contrast, under American law,
contract liability is mainly predicated upon a party's objective statement
of intention rather than her actual, but unexpressed, individual under-
standing.310 Exceptionally, the offeror's subjective intent prevails over
the literal meaning of her words when there is some mutual mistake311 or
the offeree knows or has any reason to know about the meaning attached
by the other. 312 A party has "reason to know" about the other's intent
when she has information from which a person of ordinary intelligence
would draw the inference. 313 This is known as the "reasonable person"
standard. The CISG provides a middle ground between these two ap-
proaches because under the CISG, both the subjective and the objective
intent of the parties may be pertinent, but the subjective interpretation of
the parties' intent comes first, and the objective basis will only be applied
if the individual standard is not met.314
Regarding certainty of the terms of the offer, the American commer-
cial law is much more flexible than the Brazilian law and the CISG. Ac-
cording to U.C.C. section 2-204(3), a contract for sale does not fail for
309. RrsTATEMENTr (SECOND) 01 CONTRAcoS § 26 (1979). But, depending on the lan-
guage expressed in the offer it may be considered binding. For such situation, see
Fairmont Glass Works v. Crunden-Martin Woodenware Co., 106 Ky. 659, 51 S.W.
196 (1899); Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn.
1957).
310. In Judge Learned Hand's words, "a contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do
with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation
attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent." (Hotchkiss v. Nat'l
City Bank of N.Y., 200 F.287, 293 (S.D.N.Y.1911)). See also Lucy v. Zehmer, 196
Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954); Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales
Corp., 190 F.Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
311. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H.&C. 906, 159 Eng.Rep. 375; Oswald v. Allen, 417 F.2d
43 (2d Cir.1969).
312. RFsTATEME 'NT (SEcoNo) OF CONTRACIS § 20 (1979).
313. Rr-s'1ATrl1Mew-r (SECOND) OF CONnRACeS § 19 cmt. 1 (1979).
314. JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRAcrs 476 (4th ed. 2001); MCC Marble
Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Cerdmica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1390
n.14 (11th Cir. 1998). For a dissenting opinion, see HENRY GABRIEL, CONTRAcrS
FoR THE- SALE oiF GOODS: A COMPARISON oF DoMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw 51, 52 (2004).
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indefiniteness despite missing terms. 315 If a court finds any reasonably
certain basis for granting a remedy, the agreement may be considered
valid in law. Consequently, the only essential term for an offer to be
binding is the quantity of goods.316 Except for contracts involving unique
goods or contracts for the seller's output or the buyer's requirements,317 a
court cannot supply the term if the parties fail to specify quantity, be-
cause a sales contract can be for one, two, or one thousand units of the
good. If the court cannot give a remedy for breach, then, the contract
fails for indefiniteness. With respect to non-essential terms, U.C.C. provi-
sions are used to fill in the gaps in order to facilitate enforcement of in-
complete promises. For example, U.C.C. section 2-305(1) allows parties,
if they so intend, to conclude a contract without determining the price
(known as "open price term"). In this situation, the price will be the rea-
sonable price at the time of delivery.
Unlike the Brazilian law, which considers that a binding offer becomes
effective after it is communicated to the offeree, but like the CISG, the
American law understands that a binding offer becomes effective when it
is received by the offeree. Despite this dissimilarity, the consequences of
effectiveness are the same under all three regimes; until effectiveness, the
offeror is free to change her mind and withdraw from her offer without
incurring any liability, 318 but after effectiveness, the offer can no longer
be withdrawn, because the offeree has already acquired the ability to
bring a contract into existence according to the terms of the offer.
But the offeree's power of acceptance does not last forever. As a gen-
eral rule, an offer may be freely revoked at any time until an effective
acceptance has been made, even if the offer by its terms purports to be
irrevocable, because the offeror is the "master of the offer." 319 A revoca-
tion is only effective after it is received by the offeree; thus, if the accept-
ance becomes effective prior to the receipt of the revocation by the
offeree, the contract is formed.320 This rule is similar to the Brazilian law,
but different from the CISG, which considers as irrevocable an offer that
indicates, by any means, that it is irrevocable.
315. Note that the rule that applies to other kinds of contracts is less flexible than the
U.C.C. See ResTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcIS § 33 (1979). But, the U.C.C.
is very influential and its provisions have been used by courts as inspirational gui-
dance for general Contract Law disputes. See Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc,
52 Ohio St.3d 232, 556 N.E.2d 515 (1990).
316. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (1978).
317. Id. § 2-306.
318. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 147 (7th ed. Foundation Press 2008).
319. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Clements Paper Co., 241 S.W. 2d 851 (Tenn. 1951);
Dickinson v. Dodds, Court of Appeals, Chancery Division, (1876) 2 Ch. Div. 463
(U.K.); RE-ST1ATEMEN'I' (SEvCOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1979); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 318, at 168; Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law in FUNDAMENTALS oF AMiRI-
CAN LAW-NEW YORK UNIVERfITY SCHOOL Or LAw 209 (Allan B. Morrison ed.)
(1996); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEFFS AND CAsE_ ANALYSIS IN -I-I1 LAw oF
CONTRAcrs 48-49 (2006).
320. Few states, including California, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana, have
statutes which provide that revocations are to be treated in like manner as accept-
ances (when sent).
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There are three exceptions to this rule of unlimited revocability. First,
if the offeror promises not to revoke an offer in exchange for considera-
tion (usually money), an "option contract" is formed and the promise is
irrevocable until some stated time.321 Second, written signed offers made
by "merchants" to buy or sell goods that promises to be irrevocable,
known as "firm offers," will indeed be irrevocable for up to three months,
regardless of the absence of any consideration. 322 Third, the promisee's
reliance on a promise not to revoke her offer may be enforced under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, if that reliance was detrimental to the
offeree, foreseeable to the offeror, and reasonable on the part of the of-
feree. 323 Both the Brazilian law and the CISG contain something like
this "reliance" exception; but only the CISG has a provision similar to the
American option contract and firm offers. Nonetheless, the CISG rule is
broader than the American rule because, as explained in the previous
paragraph, it requires neither consideration nor a signed written manifes-
tation, but only a single indication that the offer would be irrevocable for
a specific or a reasonable period of time.3 2 4
Furthermore, the power of acceptance may be terminated by the of-
feree's making a rejection or a counter-offer of her own, 3 2 5 which will be
discussed in section III.C.5, or by the lapse of time.3 2 6 Like the Brazilian
law and the CISG, when the offer itself puts a time limit on that power it
terminates at the end of that time, and when no time is stated in the offer
this power lasts for a "reasonable time" in the circumstances, unless ear-
lier revoked. Regarding face-to-face or telephone communications, most
American courts have understood that an offer made in the course of
conversation is deemed to lapse when the conversation is terminated and
cannot be accepted thereafter. 327 In contrast to the Brazilian law ap-
proach, under American law, the offeror's death or incapacity may also
cause the termination of revocable offers.328
321. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros, Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.1933); §25 of Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts.
322. U.C.C. § 2-205 reads: "An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed
writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable,
for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reason-
able time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months;
but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be sepa-
rately signed by the offeror." See also Wiarr & SUMMERS, supra note 282 at 48-
49; Henry Mather, Firm Offers Under the UCC and the CISG, 105 DICK. L. Riv.
31-56 (2000).
323. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACs § 87(2) (1979); Drennan v. Star Paving
Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P. 2d 757 (Cal. 1958); U.C.C. § 2-205 cmt. 2. (1978).
324. DIMAYFEO, supra note 55, at 241.
325. RFSTATEMMENT (SEcoND) oF CONTRACrS § 36(1)(a) (1979).
326. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACIS §§ 36(1)(b), 41 (1979).
327. Caldwell v. E.F. Spears & Sons, 216 S.W. 83 (Ky. 1919); Akers v. J.B. Sedberry,
Inc., 286 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. App. 1955).
328. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACeS § 36(1)(d) (1979).
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4. Acceptance
"An acceptance is a voluntary act of the offeree whereby he exercises
the power conferred upon him by the offer, and thereby creates the set of
legal relations called a contract."329 In general, according to the U.C.C.,
an acceptance does not need to coincide precisely with all the terms of
the offer, as will be explained in the following section, and it may be
made in any manner and by any medium capable of showing the offeree's
intention to be bound, unless the offeror has unequivocally indicated that
it will not be acceptable otherwise. 330
With respect to the medium of acceptance, the American law adopts an
identical position to the Brazilian law and the CISG. Accordingly, an
acceptance can either be made by oral or written words or be implied
from conduct, and need not be identical with that of the offer.331 In addi-
tion, silence does not generally constitute an acceptance; but case law has
recognized a few exceptions. One exception is "where the offeror has
stated or given the offeree reason to understand that assent may be mani-
fested by silence or inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inac-
tive intends to accept the offer." 332 Another exception is "where,
because of prior dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that the offeree
should notify the offeror if he does not intend to accept." 333
Regarding the manner of acceptance, the offeree may accept by either
returning the promise (express) or performing (tacit). 334 In order to re-
turn the promise, the offeree has to unambiguously notify the offeror of
acceptance, unless the offeror has waived such a condition.335 Likewise,
the beginning of performance is only considered acceptance if the offeree
notifies the offeror within a reasonable time of her intention to engage
herself.3 3 6 But if the offeror's order is for prompt or current shipment,
329. Corbin, supra note 304, at 199.
330. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) reads: "an offer to make a contract shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circum-
stances." But, under traditional common law, an acceptance is a manifestation of
assent to all the terms of the offer in the medium and in the manner of acceptance
dictated by the offeror. As a result, an acceptance that does not mirror the offer is
consider a rejection or a counter-offer, and an acceptance by an inappropriate me-
dium or manner will only form a contract if the language contained in the offer
merely suggests a satisfactory method of acceptance (RESTATEMENr (SE7COND) OF
CoNrRAC7rs §H 39, 50, 58-60 (1979)).
331. U.C.C. § 2-204(1); RES'A FEMEwN (SEcoNo) or CONTRACrS §§ 4, 19(1) (1979).
332. RFSTATFMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcIS § 69(1)(b) (1979); American Bronze
Corp. v. Streamway Prods., 456 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (Ohio App. 1982).
333. RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF COrRACIrs § 69(1)(c) (1979); Hobbs v. Massasoit
Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495 (Mass. 1893).
334. Under traditional common law, a contract can be either bilateral or unilateral. A
bilateral contract is one in which there are two promises (the offeror's and the
offeree's), while a unilateral contract is one in which there is one promise (the
offeror's) and one performance (the offeree's).
335. RESTATE-M-ve- (SECOND) OF CONERAces §§ 55-57 (1979).
336. U.C.C. § 2-206(2) reads: "Where the beginning of a requested performance is a
reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within
a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance". Note
that, under traditional common law, in order to accept a unilateral contract, the
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notification is not required for either conforming or non-conforming
goods.33 7 Moreover, according to case law, part performance without
due notification may create an option contract, explained in the preced-
ing section, making the offer irrevocable in order to protect the of-
feree.338 Despite the fact that neither the Brazilian law nor the CISG
explicitly require the offeree to notify the offeror about her (express or
tacit) acceptance, this requirement can be implied because under both
regimes, an acceptance only becomes effective after it reaches the offeror.
The notification requirement is made clear by the American law be-
cause, in contrast to the Brazilian law and the CISG, under this regime,
an acceptance becomes effective "as soon as put out of the offeree's pos-
session." 339 In other words, after the notification is dispatched by the
offeree (the Dispatch Theory or the common law mailbox rule). 340 Nev-
ertheless, there are two exceptions: (i) offers made by phone or other
medium of substantially instantaneous two-way communication are to be
accepted until the close of the conversation 341 and (ii) with respect to
option contracts, acceptance is only operative after it is received by the
offeror.342
The mailbox rule, in particular, has a significant effect on acceptance
and revocation, and one that is distinct from the other two regimes. Be-
cause, under American law, an acceptance becomes effective after it is
dispatched, it cannot be later revoked by an overtaking letter sent by a
faster medium of communication even though the revocation is received
by the offeror before the acceptance, 343 while it can under Brazilian law
and the CISG. 344
Furthermore, an acceptance is only effective if it is made while the of-
feree's "power of acceptance" is still operative; otherwise, it is just con-
offeree needs to complete at least part of that offer's requests to be performed or
tendered, and no notification to the offeror is required, unless the offer states oth-
erwise or if the offeror has no adequate means of learning whether the act is being
performed (RiSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNrRAcrs §§ 53-54 (1979)).
337. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b). Note that by shipping non-conforming goods, the offeree
commits herself to supply goods that conform to the offer and cannot argue later
that no contract was formed because the goods shipped did not conform with the
goods requested by the offer. But, if the defective goods are shipped as an accom-
modation to the buyer, such shipment does not constitute acceptance (Corinthian
Pharm. Sys., Inc. v. Lederle Labs., 724 F.Supp. 605 (S.D. Indiana 1989)).
338. RESTATEMENT (SFIcoNo) OF CONTRACtS §45 (1979). As a general rule, mere
preparation to perform is not considered acceptance, thus, does not have this ef-
fect (Doll & Smith v. A.&S. Sanitary Dairy Co., 211 N.W. 230 (Iowa 1926)). None-
theless, in some cases beginning preparations may constitute justifiable reliance to
make the offeror's promise binding under §87(2) of Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts (RiESTrATE.MEiNT (SecoNo) oF CONTRAcrs § 45 cmt. f (1979)).
339. RiSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACIS § 63(a) (1979).
340. Id.; Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng.Rep. 250 (King's Bench 1818).
341. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo) oF CONRACrS § 64 (1979).
342. Id. § 63(b).
343. FARNswoRTii, supra note 318, at 147.
344. The Brazilian law and the CISG understand that an acceptance becomes effective
after it reaches the offeror. Therefore, an acceptance can be withdrawn if the with-
drawal reaches the offeror prior to the acceptance.
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sidered a counter-offer. The circumstances in which the "power of
acceptance" terminates were discussed in the previous section. Excep-
tionally, if the manifestation of assent was dispatched by the offeree prior
to the expiration of the time limit given, but was received by the offeror
after the deadline and the offeror stays silent, it is seen as an effective
acceptance. 345 Both the general rule and the exception are similar to the
provisions under the Brazilian law and the CISG dealing with timely ac-
ceptances, late acceptances, and late arrivals.
5. Counter-Offer
As mentioned above, the Brazilian law, the CISG, and the American
law agree that a late acceptance should be considered a counter-offer.
But they disagree on whether expressions of assent that do not conform
integrally to the offer should be considered an acceptance or a counter-
offer. The Brazilian law and the CISG understand that a reply to an offer
that contains different or additional terms is a counter-offer. 3 4 6 Although
American common law embraces this approach for contracts in general
(the common law mirror image rule), 347 this rule does not apply for con-
tracts for the sale of goods.
A contract for the sale of goods differs from other kinds of contracts
because it is often a result of an exchange of several phone calls,
messages, purchase orders, written confirmations and standardized forms,
rather than a single integrated, carefully drafted document signed by both
parties. Because sellers' forms favor sellers and buyers' forms favor buy-
ers, a mismatch between the parties' conditions is likely to happen, espe-
cially with respect to terms on the back of the forms and in small print
that were not negotiated by the parties. This situation is called the "bat-
tle of the forms" in American legal literature.348
Being more attentive to these commercial practices, U.C.C. section 2-
207 abandoned the mirror image rule stating that a response that has dif-
ferent or additional terms operates as an acceptance unless the response
is expressly made conditional on assent to these terms, the offer expressly
limits acceptance to its terms, or the offeror objects to the offeree's new
345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAc-rs §§ 69-70 (1979). In fact, even in this sit-
uation the acceptance is considered a counter-offer that is accepted by the original
offeror if she remains silent. Because the practical effects of this wording and the
interpretation given above are the same, the latter was used in order to facilitate a
legal comparison.
346. In the case of the Brazilian law, any alteration in the response will be enough to
constitute a counter-offer. For the CISG, a response will only be seen as a
counter-offer if the additional or different terms materially alter the offer. But,
considering the fact that the CISG's list of material terms is very broad, any term
may be seen as material.
347. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Columbia Rolling-Mill Co., 119 U.S. 149
(1886); Maddox v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 259 F.Supp. 781 (W.D. Okla. 1966).
348. Wir. & SuMMLRs, supra note 281, at 29; Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. RFev. 55, 57-59 (1963).
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terms within a reasonable time.3 4 9 As a result, "neither purchaser nor
supplier can afterwards refuse performance by seizing upon boilerplate
discrepancies that had no economic significance to either party at the
time they made their deal."35 0
If the new terms are additional to the terms of the offer and are non-
material, they become part of the contract.35' If they materially alter the
offer, the response is seen as a proposal that is subject to the original
offeror's express acceptance in order to be binding. 352 The U.C.C. pro-
vides examples of both material and non-material clauses.353 Typically,
terms may be found material that would cause surprise or hardship if
included in a contract without the other party's knowledge. 354
On the other hand, if the manifestation of assent materially differs
from the terms of the offer rather than adding to it, the U.C.C. does not
provide a solution.355 There are three competing views to solve this is-
sue.3 5 6 The majority understands that conflicting terms cancel each other
out, and are, therefore, knocked out of the contract and supplemented by
U.C.C. gap-fillers. 357 The leading minority argues that the offeror's origi-
nal terms must be kept.35 8 The third approach treats "different" as "addi-
tional," so if the new discrepant term is materially different it is
considered a proposal, and if not it becomes part of the contract.3 59
When the writings of the parties do not establish a contract (i.e., when
acceptance was made expressly conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms and no express assent was given), but their conduct recog-
nizes its existence, a court may find that a contract in fact exists. 360 In
349. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) reads: "A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an accept-
ance even though it states terms additional or different from those offered or
agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the ad-
ditional or different terms"; U.C.C. § 2-207(2) reads: "Between merchants [addi-
tional] terms become part of the contract unless: (a) the offer expressly limits
acceptance to the terms of the offer. . . (c) notification of objection to them has
already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received."
350. CHInans-rEIN, supra note 319, at 68.
351. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) reads: "Between merchants [additional] terms become part of
the contract unless: (b) they materially alter it . . .
352. Id.
353. Id. cmts. 4-5.
354. Id.
355. WHITE & SUMME'RS, supra note 282, at 29-48; John E. Murray Jr., The Chaos of the
'Battle of the Forms': Solutions, 39 VAND. L. Riv. 1354-65 (1986).
356. John L. Utz, More on the Battle of the Forms: The Treatment of 'Different' Terms
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 UCC L.J. 103, 110-12 (1983).
357. Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984); Northrop Corp. v.
Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1994).
358. Valtrol, Inc. v. Gen. Connectors Corp., 884 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1989); Reaction
Molding Tech., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 588 F.Supp. 1280,1289 (E.D.Pa. 1984); Wu_-
IAM H. LAwRIENCE & WILLIAM H. HENNING, SALES AND LEASES OF, Goons 31
(1996).
359. Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal.3d 90, 141 Cal.Rptr. 157, 569 P.2d 751, 759 n.5
(1977).
360. U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
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this event, American courts tend to apply the CISG "knock-out rule,"
finding that the terms of the contract are the ones that the parties' writ-
ings have agreed on, supplemented by U.C.C. gap-fillers. 361 In contrast,
in a similar situation, Brazilian courts would apply the "last shot rule,"
finding that the contract was formed under the offeree's terms.362
Both courts and scholars have observed that U.C.C. section 2-207 "is a
challenging exercise in statutory analysis" 363 and that "its application is
often awkward and problematic." 3 6 4 Furthermore, this section has been
described as "an amphibious tank that was originally designed to fight in
the swamps, but was sent to fight in the desert." 365 Unfortunately, "there
is no language that a lawyer can put on a form that will always assure the
client of forming a contract on the client's own terms." 366
6. Moment of Contract Formation
Under the Brazilian law, the CISG, and the American common law of
contracts, a contract is formed when the acceptance becomes effective.
But the U.C.C. provides a more versatile rule for contracts for the sale of
goods, acknowledging the existence of a binding obligation even when it
is not possible to specify the exact moment the acceptance became effec-
tive and the deal was closed. 367 According to U.C.C. section 2-204(2),
''an agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found
even though the moment of its making is undetermined." 3 6 8
7. Place of Contract Formation
Like the Brazilian law, which has adopted the lex loci contractus rule to
determine the law applicable to disputes over international contracts, the
place where a contract is formed is also a relevant factor for determining
the U.C.C. territorial application because it may have a strong connection
to the transaction.
According to U.C.C. section 1-105,369 parties are free to choose the
U.C.C. as the controlling law for their contract if it bears a "reasonable
relationship" to the transaction. If there is no agreement between the
parties with regard to the applicable law, the U.C.C. may be applied if it
bears an "appropriate relationship" to the transaction. 370
361. Id.
362. IV GAGLIANO, supra note 125, at 89; GONCALVES, supra note 109, at 54; 3 PiER-
EIRA, supra note 109.
363. FARNSWORI, supra note 318, at 192.
364. KNAPP, supra note 319, at 210.
365. WIITE & SUIMERS, supra note 281, at 30.
366. Id. at 47.
367. GABRIEL, supra note 314, at 87.
368. U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
369. While revised article I has now been adopted by many states, the states that have
adopted the revisions have failed to adopt the revised § 1-301. For more informa-
tion, see Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The
Failure of Revised UCC §1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SErON
HALL L. Rrv. 59, 102-103 (2005).
370. U.C.C. § 1-301(b).
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But in contrast to the Brazilian law, the place of contracting is not the
only factor for this determination. Points of contact that have also been
considered substantial by courts are the place where either party con-
ducts business, either party's place of business, where performance is to
occur, where the goods that are the subject of the contract are located,
and where payment will take place.371
8. Formal Requirements
Although oral contracts are generally enforceable under American
common law, all American states, except for Louisiana, have enacted a
statute derived from the English Statute of Frauds of 1677, imposing a
writing requirement for specific kinds of contracts in order to avoid
fraudulent claims.372 Contrary to the Brazilian law and the CISG, con-
tracts for the sale of goods for the price of USD $500 or more fall, under
the American law, into the statute of frauds. 3 7 3 As stated by U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-201(2),374 transactions involving merchants require a written mem-
orandum to evidence the parties' agreement. This writing does not need
to be signed by the party against whom the contract is sought to be en-
forced; it only needs to be delivered to the other party within a reasona-
ble time.37 5 It becomes binding if the other party has reason to know
about its content, unless written objection is given within ten days after
receipt.376
Although the presence of a writing is essential to evidence the exis-
tence of a contract, an undocumented agreement may be legally binding,
exceptionally, if: (i) one of the parties has fully performed; (ii) the seller
has partly performed and the goods were "specially manufactured for the
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others;" (iii) "the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits" that a contract was in fact made; or
(iv) one party has relied on the oral agreement.377 Nonetheless, these
exceptions do not apply to arbitration clauses, which must be written in
371. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 47 S.Ct. 626, 71 L.Ed. 1123
(1927); Robert J. Nordstrom & Dale B. Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial
Code and the Choice of Law, 4 DUKE L.J. 623, 632 (1969).
372. FARNSWORTH, supra note 267, at 122; KNAPP, supra note 319, at 211.
373. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract
for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made between the parties . . . ."
374. U.C.C. §2-201(2) reads: "Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing
in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its content is
given within 10 days after it is received."
375. The expression "reasonable time" has been given expansive readings, as shown by
St. Ansgar Mills, Inc. v. Streit, 613 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2000).
376. See U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
377. U.C.C. § 2-201(3); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAc-Is §§ 139, 87(2) (1979);
FARNSWORTI, supra note 318, at 262-64, 294-96, 305; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 281, at 77-84.
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order to be valid by force of the Federal Arbitration Act.378 In practice,
these four exceptions have an effect similar to the Brazilian law and the
CISG approach because neither of these two regimes imposes any formal
requirement on contracts for the sale of goods, aside from the written
arbitration clause.
A problem that arises from the statute of frauds' writing requirement is
related to previous or contemporaneous oral terms agreed on by the par-
ties during the negotiation stage that do not appear in their writing.379 As
already seen, both the Brazilian law and the CISG would allow extrinsic
evidence to prove the parties' real intent. In contrast, under the Ameri-
can legal system, the common law parol evidence rule380 gives preference
to written terms over extraneous oral terms.38
With respect to contracts for the sale of goods, as specified by U.C.C.
section 2-202,382 prior or contemporaneous oral agreements are inadmis-
sible and cannot be placed before a judge when they contradict the writ-
ten terms. But a contract may be explained or supplemented: (i) by
consistent additional terms when the court finds that the parties did not
intend the writing to be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms
of the agreement 383 and-unless carefully negated-(ii) by course of per-
formance, course of dealing, or usage of trade even when the court finds
the contract to be complete and exclusive.384 The idea is that these prac-
tices "are interpretative elements that help the court to understand the
contracting parties' true intent, rather than being additional terms whose
admission as such would offend the parol evidence restriction[.]" 385 The
practical effect of these exceptions is that, to some extent, American law
is similar to the Brazilian law and the CISG, inasmuch as all three legal
regimes would consider the parties' intent with regard to the contractual
378. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
379. This problem also arises when there is no statute of frauds requiring a writing, but
the parties have reduced at least part of their agreement to a writing or writings.
380. The term "parol evidence rule" is a misleading expression. Actually, it is a sub-
stantive rule of contract law and not a rule of evidence, and it is not limited to oral
evidence, but may also include written evidence.
381. Wijrn & SuMMERs, supra note 281, at 89.
382. U.C.C. §2-202 reads: "Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda
of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of
a contemporaneous oral agreement .... "
383. U.C.C. § 2-202(b) reads: "[B]ut may be explained or supplemented (b) by evi-
dence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agree-
ment". "The more complete a writing appears to be on its face, the less likely it is
that any extrinsic term was agreed upon, even if consistent with the writing."
(WiurnE & SUMMERS, supra note 282 at 98).
384. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) reads: "[B]ut may be explained or supplemented (a) by course
of performance, course of dealing, or usage of Trade." See also U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-
208; U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2; Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3
(1971); C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Manufacturing Co., 533 N.W.2d 542
(Iowa 1995).
385. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 319, at 104.
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terms and would allow usages and practices to be incorporated into the
contract.
Importantly, there are two judge-made exceptions to the parol evi-
dence rule. The most important is the fraud exception, which precludes a
party to invoke this rule in order to shield her own fraud. 386 Mistake,
both mutual and unilateral, is the second exception.387
Because under both the Brazilian law and the CISG previous or con-
temporaneous terms may always be considered in the determination of
the parties' intent, the possibility that parties may be liable for represen-
tations made at the negotiation stage is greater than under the U.C.C. .
In order to reduce liability with respect to these representations, parties
may avail themselves of merger or integration clauses.388 A merger
clause may bar extrinsic evidence on the theory that the contract does not
constitute a complete and exclusive expression of the parties' agreement.
But it will not keep all evidence out. Submissions of course of perform-
ance, course of dealing, or usage of trade would still be admissible, as well
as rights and duties that arise by operation of law and the judge-made
exceptions mentioned above. Furthermore, merger clauses may be at-
tacked by rules on bad faith, unconscionability, or by the fact that the
parties did not intend to form an integrated contract.389
Taking into account the fact that, under American common law,
neither the parol evidence rule nor merger clauses apply to future oral
modifications of the contract, 390 the U.C.C. provides that any amendment
to the contract must be in writing despite no consideration being required
for this purpose. If the parties did not put the modification into writing, it
operates as a waiver. 391
IV. CONCLUSION
As explained in section II, Brazilian judicial courts do not respect par-
ties' freedom to choose ex ante the law that will be applicable to their
commercial transaction, but parties may bypass this problem by selecting
as the forum to solve their future disputes a Brazilian arbitration court or
386. Assoc. Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114, 3 UCC 1 (3d
Cir. 1965).
387. Braund, Inc. v. White, 486 P.2d 50, 9 UCC 183 (Alaska 1971).
388. General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 14 UCC2d 73 (6th
Cir. 1990); Dixie Aluminum Prods. Co., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 785 F.Supp.
157, 17 UCC2d 1073 (N.D.Ga. 1992). An example of a merger clause would be:
"This contract embodies the entire understanding of the parties, it is complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of this agreement, and there are not verbal agree-
ments or representations in connection therewith."
389. Wirri & SUMMERS, supra note 281, at 104-08; CIREI.STFIN, supra note 319, at
103.
390. Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc. v. Roger J. Au & Son, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 830,26 UCC 395
(E.D.Mich. 1979); Trad Indus., Ltd. v. Brogan, 246 Mont. 439, 805 P.2d 54, 14
UCC2d 718 (1991); CIREL STEIN, supra note 319, at 103; Wirrei, & SUMMERS,
supra note 281, at 108.
391. U.C.C. § 2-209 (1977); BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322 (11th
Cir. 1998).
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a foreign court in a country that recognizes the parties' right to choose
the law applicable to their contracts. In this situation, the law chosen by
the parties will be the applicable one, unless it violates the public order.
If they do not pursue this alternative path, the determination of the gov-
erning law will only be made ex post in the event of a legal dispute, by a
judge, and according to PIL rules of the forum, which generates consider-
able uncertainty for Brazilian parties and their foreign counterparts. In
that event, apart from the Third Country Exception, discussed previously,
international contracts for the sale of goods perfected between Brazilian
parties would potentially be subject to one of at least two different legal
regimes: the seller's and the buyer's place of business.
Theoretically, if one of the parties is from Brazil, one of these regimes
will be Brazil's domestic sales law. As a result, all else being equal, there
is a fifty percent chance that Brazilian sales law will regulate all interna-
tional commercial transactions involving Brazilian parties. On the other
hand, the other party being a foreigner, the other fifty percent will de-
pend on whether the country in which she has her place of business is a
CISG contracting state, and, if it is a contracting state, on whether or not
it is an article 95 reservatory contracting state. If she is from a con-
tracting state, the CISG may apply. If she is from an article 95
reservatory contracting state, the governing law may be the CISG, the
reservatory contracting state's domestic sales law, or, eventually, a non-
reservatory contracting state's domestic sales law. If she is from a non-
contracting state, its domestic sales law may apply.
Taking into account the fact that Brazil's main trading partners are
CISG contracting states (both reservatory and non-reservatory con-
tracting states), approximately sixty-five percent of Brazil's imports and
fifty-five percent of Brazil's exports would potentially be subject to the
Brazilian law or the CISG, according to 2009 figures. 392 With respect to
contracts involving parties from the United States or China, which are
reservatory contracting states, Brazil's two most important trading part-
ners, and amount to more than twenty-eight percent of Brazil's imports
and twenty-three percent of Brazil's exports, either the reservatory con-
tracting state's domestic sales law, or, eventually, a non-reservatory con-
tracting state's domestic sales law are potentially applicable, in addition
to the Brazilian law and the CISG. Regarding the remaining trade trans-
actions with parties from non-contracting states, the Brazilian law and
their respective domestic sales law are potentially applicable. Therefore,
there are in fact three potential legal regimes applicable to international
contracts involving Brazilian parties: the Brazilian sales law, the CISG,
and a foreign domestic sales law.
A comparative study of these legal regimes with respect to formation
of business contracts for the sale of goods, making use of the American
law as the foreign domestic sales law, has been made in section II. This
392. See BRAZILIAN TRADE BALANCE CONSOLIDATEIi DATA, supra note 6.
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study demonstrates that there are both similarities and differences among
these regimes, but that on the whole their approaches are very distinct,
confirming the legal uncertainty.
First of all, in spite of the fact that both the American and the Brazilian
legal systems are primarily based on statutes, their respective legislative
powers construe laws in very different ways. Laws are interpreted differ-
ently in each country and the role played by courts is much more signifi-
cant in the United States than in Brazil, despite the "Stimulas" issued by
Brazilian higher courts. In this respect, the CISG is a middle ground be-
tween the Brazilian and the American legal systems. It is neither a civil
law nor a common law rule; it is a mix of rules from these two legal sys-
tems and from socialist countries as well. With respect to formation of
sales contracts, the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code is almost a replica of the old
1916 Civil Code, whereas the 1958 American Uniform Commercial
Code's rules are much more advanced, going beyond the offer-accept-
ance analysis. In contrast, the CISG is neither old nor progressive; it is an
intermediate rule adequate to current international trade transactions.
Second, with respect to the proposal/contract essential elements, the
American law approach deviates considerably from that of the Brazilian
law. While the Brazilian law assigns great importance to the parties' real
intent and to the definiteness of the terms of the offer, the American law
gives limited importance to the parties' subjective statements of opinion,
requiring consideration as an objective manifestation of assent, while put-
ting lax constraints on certainty of terms. Under the CISG, both the sub-
jective and the objective intent of the parties are relevant, but the real
intent analysis is the rule, whereas the objective intent is the exception.
Furthermore, there is no objective requirement of assent, and the offer
has to be sufficiently definite to be binding.
Third, although as a general rule offers may-under all three legal
frameworks-be revoked by the offeror until the offeree dispatches her
acceptance and offers are irrevocable if the offeree had relied on the of-
fer being kept open and thus suffered damages, they disagree with re-
spect to the firm offer exception. Brazilian law does not expressly
regulate firm offers, but it admits that some kinds of unilateral declara-
tions of will are irrevocable, putting no restraints on this interpretation.
The CISG expressly states that offers that are indicated to be irrevocable
cannot be revoked. The American law regulates firm offers, but it re-
quires either consideration in the case of an option contract or a signed
written document in the case of firm offers between merchants.
Fourth, the Brazilian law and the CISG concur that the offeree may
withdraw her acceptance by communicating her desire before or at the
same time the acceptance is received by the offeror. In contrast, the
American law understands that a dispatched acceptance can never be
withdrawn. Therefore, while the Brazilian law and the CISG treat offeror
and offeree equally, allowing both parties to withdraw their unilateral
declarations of will, the American law treats them differently, allowing
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only the offeror to change her opinion about entering into the contractual
relationship.
Fifth, regarding a response to an offer that purports to be an accept-
ance, but has additional or different terms, both the Brazilian Civil Code
and the CISG understand that it is a rejection of the offer and counts as a
counter-offer that requires acceptance by the original offeror to form the
contract. But, while the Brazilian law adopts a strict version of the mirror
image rule, requiring all terms of the offer to mirror the terms of the
acceptance, the CISG is not so rigorous, allowing a contract to be formed
when the divergences between offer and acceptance are not material. Be-
cause the CISG's list of material terms is very broad, the Convention ap-
proach is not a huge departure from the mirror image rule. Contrariwise,
the American Uniform Commercial Code abandoned this rule admitting
that a response with different or additional terms may operate as an ac-
ceptance in some circumstances. Although the offeror has to agree with
material terms for them to become part of the contract, fewer terms
would be considered material under the U.C.C. than the CISG.
Finally, neither the Brazilian law nor the CISG demand any formality
for contracts for the sale of goods to be enforced as long as the parties
have not agreed otherwise. As a result, their existence and their terms
can be proved by any means. Contrary to this approach, the American
law as a general rule imposes a writing requirement on commercial con-
tracts with a price of $500 or more. Despite the fact that the U.C.C. re-
quires only a simple written memorandum to be delivered to the other
party, which is not complicated for parties to comply with, in most cases,
previous or contemporaneous terms would be precluded from being
presented before a court if they contradict the written document, accord-
ing to the parol evidence rule.
As a consequence of the dissimilarities between the Brazilian law, the
CISG, and the American law with respect to formation of contracts for
the sale of goods evidenced in this thesis, both Brazilian businessmen
trading internationally and their foreign counterparts are subject to un-
certainty as to the outcome in the event of a lawsuit. If, during contract
negotiation and performance, the parties act according to the domestic
rules they are accustomed to following, they may, in the event of a con-
tractual breach, have an unpleasant surprise because the applicable law
determined ex post by a judge may be a different law, such as the CISG
or a foreign law with rules that differ from the parties' domestic sales
laws. For instance, their contract may be unenforceable for not comply-
ing with a formal requirement the terms in the writing may not be the
terms originally proposed by the offeror or the terms thought to be
agreed on by the parties.
In order to reduce this legal uncertainty, there are at least three differ-
ent strategies the Brazilian government could adopt. One strategy would
be to reform article 9 of LICC recognizing the principle of party auton-
omy in order to give parties the right to choose ex ante the law that will
2011]1 551
552 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
govern their contractual relationship, even if the issue is to be resolved by
a Brazilian judicial court. But this solution would be limited to contracts
that contain a valid choice-of-law clause. Absent this clause, the legal
uncertainty would remain the same because PIL rules would be needed
to determine the applicable law.
Another solution would be to reform the 2002 Civil Code to include
rules better adapted to current international trade practices. Neverthe-
less, this solution would be limited in helping to reduce this legal uncer-
tainty because the PIL rules discussion would still be in place regardless
of the existence or the absence of a valid choice-of-law clause. More im-
portantly, because there are different levels of modern rules-such as the
U.C.C. forward-looking rule and the less than progressive CISG provi-
sions-the uncertainty with respect to the legal outcome may remain, de-
pending on the sales law used as a role model for the proposed 2002 Civil
Code reform. For example, if the new rules are modelled on the CISG
(without a formal CISG ratification), a foreign domestic sales law would
still potentially be applicable to international sales contracts perfected be-
tween Brazilian parties and parties from the United States or China, be-
cause these countries are article 95 reservatory contracting states, as
explained above. Furthermore, this legal reform would change the rules
for domestic sales contracts as well, which might or might not be desira-
ble by Brazilian businesspersons.
The best solution would be Brazil's ratification of the CISG. Taking
into account the fact that article 1(1)(a) of the CISG prevents the use of
PIL rules for the determination of the applicable law to contractual dis-
putes involving parties from contracting states, if Brazil ratifies this Con-
vention, the CISG would always govern contractual transactions between
Brazilian parties and parties from other contracting states, except if there
is a valid choice-of-law clause opting out of its provisions. This assertion
would also be true for disputes with American or Chinese parties inas-
much as article 95 would be inapplicable. In these situations, a foreign
domestic sales law would only be applicable if the forum state is a non-
contracting state and its PIL rules point to its own law or to a law of
another non-contracting state, inasmuch as non-contracting states are not
bound to the CISG.
Moreover, if Brazil ratifies the CISG without making use of the article
95 reservation, this Convention would also be applicable to commercial
contracts between Brazilian parties and parties from non-contracting
states, unless the parties have specified that a different law would regu-
late their commercial relationship, provided that PIL rules of the forum
point to the Brazilian law or to a law of another contracting state by force
of article 1(1)(b) of the CISG. Therefore, the uncertainty with respect to
the law applicable to international sales transactions would be confined
to the situations in which PIL rules of the forum indicate a law of a non-
contracting state as the governing law.
CONTRACT FORMATION
The fact that Brazil's ratification of the CISG would prevent the Brazil-
ian domestic sales law from regulating the parties' affairs does not mean
that Brazilian parties are at a disadvantage. As shown in this thesis, the
2002 Civil Code is to some extent compatible with the CISG despite the
differences between the two legal frameworks. It is true that Brazilian
businesspersons and their lawyers would have to get acquainted with the
CISG rules, which may increase transaction costs after ratification. But
in the long run, these costs may decrease or become non-existent. In fact,
Brazilian parties would benefit from the application of the CISG to their
international commercial contracts because it is a more modern and ade-
quate rule than the Brazilian domestic sales law. In any event, if the Con-
vention were not the desirable applicable law, article 6 of the CISG
would allow parties to opt out of its provisions by selecting another law,
which indirectly would make the principle of party autonomy valid in
Brazil. Moreover, the CISG would only be applicable to international
transactions; thus, domestic contracts for the sale of goods would con-
tinue to be regulated by the 2002 Civil Code.
Consequently, in order to reduce the prevailing legal uncertainty re-
garding international contracts for the sale of goods performed between
Brazilian parties and their foreign counterparts, Brazil's ratification of
the CISG without any reservation is strongly recommended. Addition-
ally, article 9 of the LICC may also be reformed to expressly embrace the
principle of party autonomy to choose the law applicable to commercial
transactions, confirming the provision of article 6 of the CISG.
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Comment and Case Note

